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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Introduction: Aims of the study and research questions 
This study assesses the relationship between two components of European Structural and 
Investment Funds (ESIF) – control and audit systems, and simplification measures designed 
to reduce the complexity of ESIF implementation – and explores how this relationship 
conditions ESIF performance.  
The research included four specific aims:  
• To provide an overview of ESIF control and audit systems. 
• To analyse control and audit provisions in 2014-20 in terms of their contribution 
to simplification.  
• To assess the role of the European Court of Auditors (ECA), including specific 
features of their audit approach. 
• To develop insights for the development of control and audit arrangements that 
enhance the pursuit of simplification and improved ESIF performance in the post 
2020 period. 
The methodology combined desk-based research, interviews at EU and MS levels, and seven 
case studies from a mix of ESIF programmes from across the EU. 
Control and audit in the simplification agenda: what is working? 
The CPR introduced a number of measures to simplify procedures and reduce the complexity 
of financial control and audit. Nevertheless, in 2017 the European Commission and the 
European Parliament restated the need to reconsider arrangements for simplifying 
control and audit.  
 
Responses from programme authorities have recognised the need for effective rules in order 
to avoid errors, fraud and the misuse of funds and welcomed the basic principles on which 
these measures are based. Nevertheless, OP authorities continue to call for greater 
simplification of OP financial management and proportionality in audit and control.  
 
A key underlying theme in the debate on the future of Cohesion policy is the need to reduce 
the costs of administering the funds while retaining the positive trend in the 
reduction of error rates. Basic questions are whether and how a differentiated approach 
could be designed that moves away from the one-size-fits-all model of shared management 
and which recognises that different models may be appropriate for different contexts. 
Conclusions and recommendations 
The current ESIF management and implementation system has been working 
effectively in driving errors and irregularities down. The problem is essentially one of 
efficiency (cost). While the costs of the current control and audit system are problematic, 
there is still a need for checks to be carried out to ensure that rules are respected.  
 
Substantial simplification has yet to be realised. A significant problem is the lack of 
stability and consistency in regulatory frameworks. Further, a substantial portion of the 
complexity of administering ESIF relates to rules that are outside the sphere of Cohesion 
policy (e.g. relating to state aid and public procurement).  
Key simplification measures have not always been effective in reducing complexity 
and administrative burden: 
Policy Department for Structural and Cohesion Policies 
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• One aim of the designation process was to give increased scope for simplification 
with MS given the option to carry out the process without direct Commission review. 
However, many MS opted to have a ‘heavier’ approach due to concerns that future 
audits and controls would identify errors.  
• The ‘rolling closure’ process presents some challenges for programme authorities 
and is seen to create an additional administrative burden, as well as an increased risk 
of error. 
• Risk-based methods of sampling for controls are viewed as beneficial by MAs, but 
AAs tend to underline the importance of retaining statistical sampling to maintain the 
necessary level of confidence in the audits realised.  
 
• The ‘Single Audit’ model is seen by programme authorities to have potential in 
terms of simplification. However, there is a need for more clarity on how and when 
an auditor can rely on existing findings. 
• Simplified cost options are welcome but need to be further developed.  
• ‘Once only’ audit for small operations is useful in principle but defining ‘small’ is 
problematic in practice. Further tailoring could use a risk-based approach. 
The research highlights a number of general principles for the future in order to reduce 
complexity, while continuing to drive errors and irregularities down. In deciding the emphasis 
to be placed on different principles, clear choices have to be made on the ultimate goals of 
simplification and the types of actors simplification efforts should target: 
 
• Harmonisation. Genuine simplification must begin with greater harmonisation of 
rules across Commission services, funds and instruments. This highlights the role of 
EU initiatives in this field, including the Better Regulation Agenda and the REFIT 
Platform.  
 
• Stability. More stability from one programme period to the next and better 
predictability for programme authorities and beneficiaries would simplify 
implementation, cut the times and costs of adaptation, and reduce the risk of errors 
and irregularities. 
 
• Brevity. There should be single texts, made available to programme authorities in a 
timely manner, rather than a proliferation of rules and interpretations. This would 
enable better coordination between different actors and the timely identification of 
administrative capacity gaps. 
 
• Trust and capacity building. The Commission has tried to introduce simplification 
by increasing the scope for flexibility and proportionality in control and audit fields. 
However, lack of trust and/or capacity have constrained take up of these options. 
Thus capacity-building activities should be implemented to enhance implementation 
efficiency in the longer term.  
• Flexibility and differentiation. Complexity affects all MS, but it has distinctive 
dimensions in different MS and OP contexts. Especially where the scale of ESIF is 
small, complexity can create disproportionate administrative workloads and lead 
potential beneficiaries to pursue alternative funding opportunities. There is 
considerable debate about a more flexible, differentiated approach to control and 
audit that reflects variation in scale of funding, regularity of spending, administrative 
Control and simplification of procedures within ESIF 
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capacity etc. However, practical questions remain about what would be suitable 
objective criteria for differentiation.  
 
• Appraisal, to avoid unintended consequences. A number of valuable 
simplifications have already been introduced but their benefits have been undermined 
by new requirements which generated further complexity. It is paramount that the 
impact on administrative cost and burden of any reform proposal is carefully appraised 
and compared with the benefits associated with retaining the current rules and 
systems.  
 
• Timing. Commission and programme authorities, including AAs, are being asked to 
make proposals for the future over the next few months. However, due to delays in 
programme implementation, they have little evidence to assess what is and is not 
working. All involved should take a longer-term view in appraising what works and 
what doesn’t. 
 
• Role of the European Commission. Continued pursuit of simplification initiatives, 
reviewing and revising current regulations, including the HLG on Simplification, ‘Better 
Regulation Agenda’ and the REFIT Platform and support of capacity-building initiatives 
in MS to strengthen simplification (e.g. in the take up of SCOs, extension of the ‘Single 
Audit’ etc.).  
 
• Role of ECA. The ECA is crucial in balancing the need for legality and regularity of 
expenditure with the need for simplification. Current initiatives to strengthen cross 
reliance with the Commission and MS should be further developed.  
 
• Role of Member States. It is important that MS play an active part in reducing 
complexity, by reviewing domestic choices that can have an impact on complexity, 
e.g.  ‘gold-plating’, number of OPs implemented, design of programme management 
systems etc. 
 
• Performance auditing. The spread of performance audits and their use in making 
financial decisions should be further pursued at EU and MS levels. However, this 
should not detract from efforts to lower the historical error rate. Performance audits 
have different goals than compliance audits: increasing use of performance audits 
should not mean reducing the emphasis on financial regularity and compliance. 
 
• Accountability. ESIF control and audit procedures are part of an accountability chain 
involving MS and EU authorities which has seen not only a reduction in error rates, 
but also increased transparency on Cohesion policy’s legality, regularity and 
achievements. The strength of this chain relies on the strength of its individual 
components at both EU and MS levels.  
 
The research also provided some practical recommendations: 
 
• The designation procedure should be reconsidered, targeting systems that are 
or have recently been in flux for full designation process but applying lighter 
approaches for established, stable systems;  
 
• More clarity should be provided on aspects that relate to the application of 
SCOs. Procedures should be put in place to ensure that simplified controls on some 
aspects are not counterbalanced with additional controls on other elements of the 
Policy Department for Structural and Cohesion Policies 
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same projects. A useful rule is contained in Article 14(i) of the ESF Regulation, which 
allows standard scales of unit costs and ‘lump sums’ to be set out in a delegated act. 
 
• Annual reporting should be further streamlined. Simplification should include 
the timely publication of Commission guidelines, so that IT systems can be planned 
to collect the right data from the start, and the elimination of duplications or overlaps 
between this task and the Annual Control report prepared by the Audit Authority. 
• Dedicated rules and support should be established for the control and audit 
arrangements of specific types of programmes and operations, notably 
European Territorial Cooperation programmes and Financial Instruments. For FIs, 
options include: separating out FIs in dedicated priorities; setting minimum allocations 
for the funds to be established (e.g. EUR 200 million); standardising the structures of 
funds; providing targeted and clear-cut Commission guidance to enhance legal 
certainty. For ETC, special exemptions or differentiation of rules could simplify 
management and limit the risk of errors. Special consideration should be given to the 
application of State aid rules.  
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1.   INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background of the study 
This study assesses the relationship between two components of European Structural 
and Investment Funds (ESIF) – control and audit systems, and simplification 
measures designed to reduce the complexity of ESIF implementation – and explores 
how this relationship conditions ESIF performance.  
 
Financial control and audit are essential functions of any public policy. Beyond 
ensuring the regularity and legality of operations, and the sound financial management of 
procedures, control and audit provides important insights on implementation for programme 
authorities, allowing them to improve programme management and delivery and redress 
mistakes (e.g. recovering funds from beneficiaries). Thus, control and audit functions not 
only to strengthen trust and accountability, but also enhance the performance of the funds. 
Control and audit activities must be timely, in the sense that they have to enable corrective 
action to be taken, make those accountable accept responsibility, obtain compensation, or 
take steps to prevent or at least minimise breaches. Undertaking these functions, however, 
entails administrative complexity as substantial time and resources are dedicated to tracking, 
justifying and checking spend. 
 
Issues of complexity are particularly relevant in ESIF where funding is 
implemented under ‘shared management’ and where European Union (EU) and 
Member State (MS) level bodies participate in multiple controls. In 2014-20, 
substantial efforts are being made to simplify, streamline and harmonise rules to increase 
both the accessibility and the performance of ESIF. Nevertheless, tensions between 
administrative complexities and the need for control continue to have an impact on ESIF 
performance. As the debate on the future of ESIF post-2020 intensifies, a key question is the 
degree to which a balance between the requirements for financial control and the need to 
limit complexity can be achieved. 
Thus, the study provides an analysis of the control and audit systems used in ESIF, assessing 
efforts to reconcile the need for control and audit with the pursuit of simplification and 
enhanced performance. 
1.2  Objectives 
The research assessed the relationship between two components of ESIF – control and audit 
systems, and simplification measures designed to reduce the complexity of ESIF 
implementation – and explored how this relationship conditions ESIF performance. 
Within this, the research included four specific aims:  
• To provide an overview of the control and audit systems within ESIF, including the 
role of authorities and bodies involved. 
  
• To produce a critical analysis of the control and audit provisions of the 2014-20 
programming period in terms of their contribution to simplification.  
 
• To analyse the role of the European Court of Auditors (ECA), including specificities of 
their audit approach (e.g. sampling methods, debate about error rate, different types 
of audit reports, etc.).  
Policy Department for Structural and Cohesion Policies 
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• To develop insights for the development of control and audit arrangements that 
enhance the pursuit of simplification and improved ESIF performance in the post 2020 
period.  
 
An analytical framework was developed to achieve these aims. This had four basic elements:  
• Disaggregation of different responsibilities across the EU and MS levels in order 
to identify where in control and audit systems the most complex tasks lie. 
 
• Definition of complexity in order to assess the nature and extent of the complexity 
associated with these different tasks. The definition includes costs incurred by the 
authorities charged with the management of the funds to undertake the tasks of 
financial control and audit (the work of administrative staff or outsourced tasks) and 
the administrative burden incurred by beneficiaries to comply with programme 
financial management and audit requirements.  
 
• Mapping simplification measures onto the complexities of control and audit. 
A key part of the analytical framework is the mapping of different simplification 
measures and initiatives onto ESIF control and audit systems and procedures. 
 
• Determining the impact on ESIF performance. Lastly, it was necessary to 
differentiate between various understandings of the ‘performance’ of ESIF. This is 
important as different audit and control provisions and simplification measures can 
influence different dimensions of performance: legality and regularity; financial 
absorption; timeliness of administrative activities; and, programme effectiveness. 
 
Key research questions are grouped under four headings: 
Based on the overall and specific objectives of the research and the issues highlighted in the 
analytical framework, the key research questions were identified as follows: 
• Where does the complexity of ESIF control and audit lie? Which tasks create 
most complexity? Who bears this complexity? What impact do EU control and audit 
approaches have on this? What is the ‘tipping point’ beyond which adding more effort 
towards control and audits does not deliver returns? What reforms or measures can 
MS authorities introduce to ease complexity?  
• What is the impact of the EU’s simplification initiatives in addressing complexity 
in audit and control? Which are or are not working and why? 
• What impact are control and audit provisions having on the performance of 
operational programmes (OPs)? Are simplification measures in the area of audit 
and control having an impact on different measures of performance (e.g. legality and 
regularity, financial performance, progress toward OP targets?) 
• Engaging in the post-2020 debate. How can control and audit arrangements 
enhance the pursuit of simplification and improve ESIF performance in the post 2020 
period? 
1.3 Methodology 
The research included five key tasks: providing an overview of the control and audit systems 
within ESIF; producing a critical analysis of the control and audit provisions of the 2014-20 
programming period in terms of their contribution to simplification; carrying out specific 
analysis of the role of the ECA; developing insights for the development of control and audit 
Control and simplification of procedures within ESIF 
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arrangements that enhance the pursuit of simplification and improved ESIF performance in 
the post 2020 period; and providing conclusions and recommendations. These involved a 
combination of desk-based research and interviews at EU and MS levels, detailed below. 
1) Overview of the control and audit systems within ESIF. Addressing ESIF but 
focusing on the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the European Social 
Fund (ESF) and the Cohesion Fund (CF), Task 1 was to provide an overview of the 
structures and processes involved in ESIF control and audit systems. This was based 
on documentary analysis of secondary data sources and legislation. Consulted 
documents included legislative documents (regulations, implementing and delegated 
acts) and official guidance documents relating to audit and control. 
 
2) Critical analysis of control and audit provisions. Task 2 was to produce a critical 
analysis of the control and audit provisions of the 2014-20 programming period in 
terms of their contribution to simplification. This Task comprised: 
 
• Assessment of related literature. This included EU-level interviews at DG 
Regional and Urban Policy and DG Employment Directorates for Audit, the DG 
Regio Unit for Operational Efficiency, and the DG Regio Unit for Coordination, 
Relations with ECA and OLAF (the European Anti-Fraud Office). Interviews 
were also carried out with ECA representatives. 
 
• Case study research. Case studies of efforts to reconcile the requirements 
of sound financial control and audit and simplification in individual OPs 
provided a central component of the methodology. In addition to documentary 
research, case studies included interviews with the key organisations and 
actors involved: MAs and AAs. Seven programme case studies were selected 
based on: the implementation system, programme type and funding type and 
geographical area (see Table 1). 
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Table 1: List of case studies 
Countries 
covered OP Objective OP type 
Geographical 
area 
EU 
funding 
sources 
Germany Bavaria Employment OP 
More 
developed Regional Central Europe ESF 
Denmark 
Innovation and 
Sustainable 
Growth in 
Business OP 
More 
developed National 
Northern 
Europe ERDF 
Romania Regional OP Less developed 
Integrated 
regional 
Eastern 
Europe ERDF 
Belgium Flanders More developed Regional Central Europe ERDF 
Portugal Human Capital OP Mixed National 
Southern 
Europe ESF 
Poland 
Infrastructure 
and 
Environment OP 
Less 
developed National 
Eastern 
Europe 
ERDF & 
Cohesion 
Fund 
Croatia, 
Italy, 
Greece, 
Slovenia 
(and 4 
non MS) 
Adriatic Ionian 
OP Mixed 
Territorial 
cooperation / 
transnational 
Southern 
Europe and 
Balkans 
ERDF 
 
3) Analysis of the role of the European Court of Auditors. Including how specific 
aspects of its audit approach contribute to the reconciliation of control and 
simplification requirements. This Task included interviews with representatives of the 
Court. 
4) Insights for the post-2020 period. Focusing on the ongoing debate on ESIF reform 
for the post-2020 period and based on desk research and interviews at EU and MS 
levels.  
5) Synthesis, conclusions and recommendations. Synthesising the results of the 
previous Tasks, including practical insights on how the need for control and audit can 
be reconciled with the pursuit of simplification and enhanced ESIF performance and a 
focus on the lessons learned and the outlook for ESIF post-2020. 
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1.4 Structure of the study 
 
The study is structured in five further sections: 
• Section 2 sets out the study’s research context. This includes analysis of the role and 
importance of ESIF audit and control, experiences in 2007-13 (identifying benefits, 
costs), and introducing key challenges faced in finding a balance between systems 
which are rigorous enough to detect irregularities yet not too complex for 
beneficiaries.  
 
• Section 3 comprises a description of ESIF financial control and audit systems and 
tasks in 2014-2020, and an assessment of the causes and locations of complexity in 
these systems. 
 
• Section 4 explores how complexity arising from control and audit is addressed in the 
simplification agenda. This includes a review of key simplification measures introduced 
for ESIF in 2014-20 and an assessment of the experiences of programme authorities 
concerning these initiatives thus far in the period. 
 
• Section 5 turns to the treatment of control and simplification in the post-2020 debate. 
It includes a summary of the proposals tabled by the HLG on simplification and the 
review of opinions of the interviewees consulted for the study on the utility of the 
various measures being discussed. 
 
• Section 6 draws together the key lessons learned from the study, developing a set 
of main conclusions and recommendations for EU-level institutions and programme 
authorities. 
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2.  RESEARCH CONTEXT  
SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS 
• The ESI Funds are implemented under a shared management system between the 
Commission and Member States. A wide range of regulatory requirements is codified 
in EU legislation to govern the use of EU Funds in the Member States. These rules are 
seen as complex and administratively burdensome, prompting regular calls for 
simplification. 
• Over the past decade, there has been increasing emphasis on the financial control 
and audit of ESI Funds accompanied by increasing regulations and guidance in this 
field. As a result, the rules that aim to ensure compliance with the principles of 
regularity, legality and sound financial management have become a key focus of calls 
for simplification. 
• For the 2007-13 period, it is not yet possible to provide a final assessment of audit 
and control activities and results, since the deadline for submission of closure 
packages to the Commission by the MSs was 31 March 2017 and closure 
documentation is still being appraised. However, recent ECA analysis of audit and 
control in 2007-13 has found that the Commission used the measures at its disposal 
to protect the EU budget more extensively and effectively than in the past. 
• The evidence suggests that growth in audit and control is having a significant positive 
impact on the level of regularity, as the evolution of Cohesion policy control and audit 
systems over the past two decades has reduced error rates. 
• On the other hand, despite regulatory reforms and significant effort on the part of the 
Commission and Member State authorities, growth in audit and control activities has 
been accompanied by significant challenges, including increased cost and burden and 
a negative effect on programme performance. 
• Finding the right balance between systems that are rigorous enough to detect 
irregularities yet not too demanding or complex for administrations and beneficiaries 
is a difficult task.  
• Building on earlier simplification efforts, the Common Provisions Regulation (CPR) for 
2014-20 introduced a number of measures intended to simplify procedures and 
reduce the administrative burden associated with programme management and 
delivery. However, the initial experiences of the implementation of these measures 
have highlighted the need for further fine-tuning and programme authorities have 
queried whether there has been genuine simplification overall.  
• A series of initiatives have been designed by the European Commission to improve 
ESIF performance by breaking the ‘vicious cycle’ of complexity, balancing 
requirements for sound financial control with the need for simplification. They include 
the High-Level Group on Simplification, the Omnibus Regulation (set to come into 
force in 2018), and the Better Regulation Agenda. 
2.1 The role and importance of ESIF audit and control 
ESIF is implemented under a shared management system between the Commission 
and Member States. In practice, the lead responsibility for all aspects of programme design 
and delivery lies with Member State authorities through a highly devolved, multi-level 
governance model. At the same time, a wide range of regulatory requirements is codified in 
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EU legislation to govern the use of EU funds in the Member States. These rules are seen as 
complex and administratively burdensome, prompting regular calls for 
simplification from both EU and national actors and stakeholders.  
Prominent in this debate are rules that aim to ensure compliance with the principles 
of regularity, legality and sound financial management.1 Over the past decade, 
there has been increasing emphasis on the financial control and audit of ESI Funds. 
This has been driven by: 
• Concerns among policy-makers about the efficiency and accountability of 
Cohesion policy under the shared management system. Under this system, the 
design and operation of sound financial management systems is the responsibility of 
authorities at both EU and Member State levels. 
 
• High error rates and high political salience. ESIF accounts for a substantial 
proportion of the EU budget (around 40% in 2014-20). The regional policy component 
(European Regional Development Fund - ERDF, European Social Fund - ESF and 
Cohesion Fund - CF), which is the focus of this study, accounts for just under one-
third of the EU budget. High error rates for Cohesion policy, above the upper threshold 
(a 5% level of materiality2) adopted by the ECA for its transaction testing 
methodology, were perennially reported in its Annual Reports3 with Commission 
explanations pointing to the inevitable complexity resulting from the involvement of 
a number of bodies at different levels and the high number of beneficiaries and co-
financed operations linked to the overall volume of funds.4  
 
• The financial and non-financial benefits of audit and control. Financial 
corrections under Cohesion policy resulting from controls and audits at any level 
excludes from EU funding expenditure that is not in accordance with applicable rules 
and regulations (e.g. ineligible expenditure or projects). When irregularities are 
detected, sums are recovered. However, ESIF audit and control also entails non-
financial benefits in some MS, notably the introduction of mechanisms for the 
detection and rectification of irregularities and improvements in the implementation 
and performance of programmes. In the words of practitioners, financial management 
is "one of the most important links between efficient management within the 
Commission and effective governance reaching out into the Member States”.5 
 
Against this background, there has been an increasing focus on financial management, 
control and audit in ESIF over the past decade. According to experts, Cohesion policy 
has witnessed an explosion in audit and control systems since the mid-2000s.6 Reforms have 
included a package that comprised the creation of the Commission’s Internal Audit Service 
in 2001, as well as strengthening of financial control and audit functions in the Commission 
Directorates-General responsible for major components of the EU budget. It also led to the 
adoption in 2002 of a new Financial Regulation setting out broad principles and basic rules 
                                           
1  Bachtler J and Mendez C (2010) Review and assessment of simplification measures in Cohesion policy 2007-
2013, note to the European Parliament's Committee on Regional Development. 
2  Errors are material if they exceed a certain level of error that is above what would be considered to be tolerable. 
3  Levy R, Barzelay M and Porras Gómez A-M (2011) ‘The reform of financial management in the European 
Commission: a public management policy cycle case study’, Public Administration, 89 (4). pp. 1546-1567. 
4  ECA (2008), ‘Annual Report for Financial Year 2007’, Luxembourg, Official Journal C 286, 10/11/2008, p145. 
5  Mendez C and Bachtler J. (2011) ‘Administrative reform and unintended consequences: an assessment of the 
EU Cohesion policy ‘audit explosion’, Journal of European Public Policy, 18 (5). 
6  Ibid. 
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relating to the EU budget. In 2008, the Commission published an Action Plan aimed at 
improving its supervision of Member States' management, control and audit systems.  
2.2 Control and audit experience in 2007-13: benefits, costs 
 
For the 2007-13 period, it is not yet possible to provide a final assessment of audit 
and control activities and results, since the deadline for submission of closure packages 
to the Commission from MS was 31 March 2017 and documentation is still being appraised. 
However, the ECA has analysed the way in which the Commission has made use of the 
regulatory provisions that were available during this period to protect the EU budget from 
irregular spending, and where possible and appropriate, included a comparison with the 
2000‐06 period.7 
ECA analysis of audit and control in 2007-13 has found that: 
• The Commission used the measures at its disposal to protect the EU budget 
more extensively than in the past. Financial corrections of around EUR 3 326 
million had been imposed by the end of 2015. This corresponds to 1.0 % of the total 
budget envelope. In addition, payments for around EUR 28 446 million had been 
interrupted (8% of the total allocated envelope). 
 
• Preventive measures (suspensions and interruptions of payments when 
potential deficiencies are revealed by control and audit) were applied earlier 
and more extensively in 2007‐13. This allowed for more timely improvements to 
a larger number of management and control systems. 
 
• There was a relative increase in financial corrections imposed8 during the 
2007‐2013 period when compared to the level of irregular spending detected, 
indicating that the Commission had used the measures at its disposal to protect the 
EU budget more extensively.  
 
• The evolution of Cohesion policy control and audit systems has improved 
control and audit frameworks, with a significant, positive impact on error 
rates. Changes introduced over the past 10-15 years, and especially the regulatory 
reforms introduced in 2007-13 (including the establishment of AAs) have improved 
control and audit frameworks and are having a significant, positive impact on error 
rates.9 This is particularly visible when comparing error rates for the expenditure 
incurred in 2000-06 and 2007-13: for expenditure incurred in 2000-06 in 2007 and 
2008 at least 11% was affected by error, whereas for the expenditure incurred until 
2009 in the period 2007-13, the error rate estimated by the ECA was of at least 3%.10 
The positive trend seems to continue. The Commission’s and the Court’s estimated 
levels of error for the last three years of payments under the ‘Cohesion’ heading 
                                           
7  ECA (2017) Special Report Protecting the EU budget from irregular spending: The Commission made increasing 
use of preventive measures and financial corrections in Cohesion during the 2007-2013 period. 
8  Financial corrections can be implemented by through deducting irregular expenditure from the Member State’s 
payment claim, by the payment of a recovery order issued by the Commission, or by decommitment. The 
deduction can take two forms: withdrawal or recovery from beneficiaries. 
9  Karakatsanis G and Weber M (2016) ‘The European Court of Auditors and Cohesion policy’, in Piattoni S and 
Polverari L (eds) Handbook on Cohesion policy in the EU, pp. 170-185, Edward Elgar: Cheltenham.  
10  Ibidem, p. 172. 
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(covering DGs REGIO and EMPL) show a falling most likely error rate from 6.9% to 
5.2% of funding (see Figure 1). 
Figure 1: Commission, ECA estimated levels of error, ‘Cohesion’ 2013- 2015 
 
Source: European Commission (2017) Root causes of errors and actions taken (Article 32(5) of the Financial 
Regulation), Brussels, 28.2.2017. Based on Court's Annual Reports and DGs REGIO and EMPL Annual 
Reports for the financial years 2013 to 2015. 
 
On the other hand, despite regulatory reforms and significant efforts on the part of the 
Commission and Member State authorities, growth in audit and control activities has been 
accompanied by significant challenges: 
• Error declining but still high compared to other EU budget headings. The error 
rate for ESIF has remained persistently above the materiality threshold (set at 2%). 
 
• Increased complexity. There is continued awareness among programme authorities 
and beneficiaries of the ‘perverse effects’ of ESIF control and audit, in terms of 
increasing the complexity of implementation and reducing the efficiency and 
effectiveness of programmes. The ex post evaluation of 2007-13 delivery systems 
found inefficiencies stemming from the multiplication of controls, inconsistent 
interpretation of rules, a low up-take of simplification measures11, contributing to high 
administrative cost and burden on beneficiaries.12  
 
• Increased administrative costs. According to information presented by the 
Commission in 2011, the overall administrative cost for the implementation of OPs for 
the 2007–13 programming period is 3.2 % of the total budget. Based on this 
information, the ‘cost of control’, which relates to the verification, certification and 
                                           
11  Including the single audit approach, as single audit status by end of 2014 had been granted only to 76 out of 
440 ERDF/Cohesion Fund and ESF OPs, Karakatsanis G and Weber M (2016) Op. cit., pp. 176-77. 
12  KPMG and Prognos (2016) Ex post evaluation of Cohesion policy programmes 2007-2013, focusing on the 
European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the Cohesion Fund (CF). Final report to the Directorate-
General for Regional and Urban Policy (European Commission), work package 12 – Delivery system, pp. 17-18. 
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audit activities carried out by national authorities, accounts for 0.9 % of the total 
budget (i.e. less than 30% of the total administrative cost). Around one fifth of the 
‘cost of control’ is related to ‘programme audit’ (the work of national audit 
authorities).13 Another study sheds further light on the cost of ESIF audits (ERDF and 
CF) to the national authorities.14 The study estimated the total cost related to the 
administration of the Funds for the period 2007-13 to be EUR 12.5 billion. Audit costs 
for the same period are estimated at EUR 1.05 billion, representing 8.4% of the total 
cost. Increased levels of control have caused a significant administrative burden on 
national administrations and beneficiaries. This is particularly the case in Member 
States where administrative capacity or experience of ESIF implementation is limited, 
in programme contexts where funding covers a large number of smaller operations, 
or where specific types of programme (e.g. European Territorial Cooperation) or 
operation (e.g. Financial Instruments - FIs) create specific challenges for control and 
audit.15    
 
• Negative impact on ESIF performance. There are a number of ways in which the 
complexity created by increased control and audit provisions have complicated 
implementation and hampered policy performance. Complexity acts as a disincentive 
for administrations to the financing of experimental and riskier projects; making 
administrations reluctant to support new types of beneficiaries, which lack a track 
record of successful project completion; leading programme authorities to focus 
administrative resources almost exclusively on the tasks of control and audit at 
detriment of strategic design and project generation and selection; and, discouraging 
potential beneficiaries from applying for support, especially where alternative sources 
of funding are available.16 Dealing with the tasks of control and audit also limits the 
time available for Managing Authorities (MAs) and Implementing Bodies (IBs) to carry 
out more strategic monitoring of performance, as emerged in case study interviews. 
Programme authorities are aware of an increasing focus on results and performance 
but financial compliance still takes priority as non-compliance leads to financial 
corrections while failure to achieve results does not. Obligations in terms of 
management verifications and audits mean that there is less time to monitor the 
actual achievements of operations and programmes.    
 
2.3 Control and simplification 
Finding the right balance between systems that are rigorous enough to detect 
irregularities yet not too time-consuming or complex for administrations and 
beneficiaries is a difficult task. While European Parliament resolutions17 and ECA reports18 
                                           
13  SWECO (2010), Regional governance in the context of globalisation – reviewing governance mechanisms & 
administrative costs. Administrative workload and costs for Member State public authorities of the 
implementation of ERDF and Cohesion Fund, DG Regional Policy (June 2010) 
14  European Parliament (2012) Op. cit; t33 et al. (2012) Measuring the impact of changing regulatory requirements 
to administrative cost and administrative burden of managing EU Structural Funds (ERDF and Cohesion Funds), 
Brussels: European Commission, Directorate-General for Regional Policy. 
15  SWECO (2010) Op. cit. 
16  Davies S and Polverari L (2011) 'Financial accountability and European Union Cohesion policy', Regional Studies, 
vol. 45, no. 5, pp. 695-706. 
17  See, for instance, European Parliament resolution of 16 May 2017 on the Annual Report 2015 on the protection 
of the EU’s financial interests – Fight against fraud. 
18  ECA (2017) Op. cit. 
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emphasise the need for systems and procedures that reduce the level of irregularities and 
fraud, stakeholders and practitioners call for initiatives to simplify those systems.  
A number of simplification measures were introduced to ESIF audit and control 
systems already during 2007-13 (and a few even during 2000-06). However, 
uptake was often limited. Notable initiatives included: 
• The ‘single audit’ principle. The principle of proportionality and reduction of 
European Commission audit work following an unqualified audit opinion issued by the 
national Audit Authority and the ‘single audit’ principle (Art. 73 of Council Regulation 
(EC) No 1083/200619). The ‘single audit’ principle, specified in Article 73 of Regulation 
(EC) No 1083/2006, referring to a system where each level of control builds on the 
preceding one is important in this regard. ’Single audit’ aims at preventing the 
duplication of control work and reducing the overall cost of control and audit activities 
at the level of the MS and the Commission. It also aims at decreasing the 
administrative burden on those audited. “Article 73 status” meant that the 
Commission was satisfied that the national compliance assessment and the audit 
authority’s audit strategy provided sufficient assurance that the management and 
control systems of the Operational Programme functioned effectively. This allowed the 
Commission to reduce its own audits and checks on the programme or Member State 
and to use its resources elsewhere to audit those programmes considered more at 
risk. Concerning uptake, as of December 2012, the Commission had granted Article 
73 status to 61 of the 434 OPs in 12 of the 27 Member States: 51 ERDF OPs in 10 
Member States and 10 ESF OPs in five Member States.20 This pattern repeated the 
experience of ‘contracts of confidence’ in the 2000-2006 period. Contracts were 
bilateral administrative arrangements signed with national authorities by the 
Commission if it had reasonable assurance that the financial management and control 
systems for one or more funds complied with the requirements of Commission 
Regulation (EC) No 438/2001 and that the national authorities had drawn up 
a satisfactory audit strategy. The Member State also undertook to submit reports on 
its audit activities to the Commission. Where a contract of confidence was signed, the 
Commission agreed in principle that it would no longer carry out audits in the Member 
State (or region) concerned. Contracts of confidence were signed between 2005 and 
2009 with Austria, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Portugal, Lithuania, UK (England), UK 
(Wales) and Slovenia for 55 OPs.21 
 
• Simplified Cost Options (SCOs). SCOs are options for programme authorities to 
calculate eligible expenditure of grants and repayable assistance on the basis of flat 
rate financing, standard scales of unit costs and lump sums. They were introduced to 
address concerns over administrative, burdens reduce error rates, enhance the access 
to the Structural Funds of small beneficiaries with limited capacities and, in the 
medium-term, allow for a refocussing of resources towards the achievement of policy 
objectives. In terms of uptake, in 2007-2013 7% of total ESF expenditure, or 
approximately EUR 8 billion, was declared under at least one type of SCO; 63 OPs 
used flat-rate financing, 65 OPs used unit costs, and 12 OPs used lump sums. Data 
                                           
19  Council Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006 of 11 July 2006 laying down general provisions on the European Regional 
Development Fund, the European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund and repealing Regulation (EC) No 
1260/1999 
20  ECA (2013) ‘Taking stock of ‘single audit’ and the Commission’s reliance on the work of national audit authorities 
in Cohesion’, Special Report No 16/2013. 
21  In line with the Communication on contracts of confidence (SEC(2004)632/2) adopted by the Commission on 18 
May 2004.  
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for ERDF uptake of SCOs are currently being gathered but a representative of DG 
REGIO noted in 2017 that it has been limited.22  A DG EMPL survey highlighted the 
legal uncertainty, fear of systemic error and poor alignment with national/regional 
legal systems as causes of limited uptake.23 
 
Building on earlier simplification efforts, the CPR for 2014-20 introduced a number 
of further measures intended to simplify procedures and reduce the administrative 
burden associated with programme management and delivery.24 Based on the shortcomings 
that emerged during the 2007-13 period, reforms introduced for the 2014-20 period 
introduced a number of innovations aimed at simplifying control and audit requirements.  
Simplification was a major theme during the debate on the reform of Cohesion policy for the 
2014-20 period and in the new regulations. As well as supporting the extended application 
of the ‘single audit’ principle and SCOs, further key changes involved: 
• More flexibility. The option for multi-Fund programmes and monitoring committees; 
the option to merge the MA and CA; and, more varied options for FIs; 
  
• Improved clarity on tasks and responsibilities of different authorities. 
Assignment to the MAs of the responsibility of carrying out proportionate and effective 
antifraud measures, based on risk assessment, and the possibility for programmes 
with financial allocations less than EUR 250 million to subsume the Audit Authority 
within the same authority that also acts as Managing Authority; 
 
• Increased proportionality. This included: the use of risk-based methods of 
sampling for controls; the decision that smaller projects would be audited only once 
before closure; scope to reduce controls & audit intensity, including through the 
extended application of the ‘single audit’ principle; 
 
• Simplified designation of control and audit systems. The aim to move to national 
designation instead of Commission approval of management and control systems 
(review by the Commission only in specific cases); 
 
• Legal certainty through clearer rules, for instance through the use of flat rates 
for revenue-generating projects; 
 
• Simplified audit arrangements for Financial Instruments; 
 
• Lighter reporting requirements (e.g. for annual reports); 
 
• Reducing the administrative burden for beneficiaries (e.g. through increased 
use of SCOs); 
 
                                           
22  ‘Simplification network singled out for its “great” work on SCOs’: 
https://ec.europa.eu/esf/transnationality/content/simplification-network-singled-out-its-great-work-scos 
23  DG EMPL (2016) Simplified Cost Options in the European Social Fund: promoting simplification and result-
orientation, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2016.  
24  For a review see Davies S (2015) ‘Is simplification simply a fiction?’ IQ-Net Thematic Paper 37(2), European 
Policies Research Centre, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow; and EPRC (2016) ‘The simplification of EU Cohesion 
policy: Problems and Priorities for Change’, IQ-Net Briefing, January 2016, European Policies Research Centre, 
University of Strathclyde, Glasgow. 
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• Easing audit burden at closure. Including through mandatory annual closure of 
operations in the annual clearance of accounts; 
 
• E-Cohesion; and,  
 
• Simplification of European Territorial Co-operation. 
 
However, the initial experiences of the implementation of these measures have 
highlighted the need for further fine-tuning.25 Programme authorities have queried 
whether there has been genuine simplification if the whole package of regulations, acts and 
guidelines is taken into account, and argued that simplification has benefited beneficiaries 
but not OP authorities. According to some programme authorities, reforms introduced for 
2014-20 also added new rules that generated more complexity, undermining gains resulting 
from simplification initiatives. For instance, programme authorities have experienced 
additional complexity from the introduction of ex-ante conditionalities and the Performance 
framework.26 The aims of these measures are important: to strengthen the effectiveness of 
Cohesion policy implementation through strengthening policy, regulatory and institutional 
conditions and through closely monitoring progress against objectives and targets. 
Nevertheless, the efficacy and impact of these measures in achieving these goals remains 
open to question. It is important that analyses of these measures takes into account their 
‘fitness for purpose ’as well as the additional administrative burden that they generate. 
Programme authorities from across the EU continue to call for greater simplification of OP 
financial management and proportionality in audit and control.27  
In the course of the 2014-20 period, the European Commission and the European 
Parliament have both restated the need to reconsider arrangements for simplifying 
control and audit.28  This applies to the remainder of the period and the future, reviewing 
the operationalisation of shared management in order to avoid the delays that are 
characterising the current programming cycle, and render all procedures more manageable 
for the authorities in charge of the funds and programme beneficiaries.  
• A High Level Group on Simplification, established by the Commission in July 
2015,29 has formulated a number of recommendations on simplification in a number 
of areas,30 including control and audit (see Section 5). 
 
                                           
25  Ibid. 
26  Bachtler J, Mendez C and Polverari L (2016) ‘Ideas and Options for Cohesion policy Post 2020’, IQ-Net Thematic 
Paper 38(2), European Policies Research Centre, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, and European Court of 
Auditors (2017) Ex ante conditionalities and performance reserve in Cohesion: innovative but not yet effective 
instruments, Special report N°15/2017.  
27  Lehuraux T (2017) ‘Gathering implementation speed: the progress of Structural Funds programmes’, IQ-Net 
Review Paper 40(1), European Policies Research Centre, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow. 
28  European Commission (2016a) Strategic Plan 2016-2020, DG Regional and Urban Policy, May 2016, Brussels; 
European Parliament (2017a) Resolution of 16 February 2017 on investing in jobs and growth – maximising the 
contribution of European Structural and Investment Funds: an evaluation of the report under Article 16(3) of the 
CPR (P8_TA -PROV(2017)0053 ); European Parliament (2017b) Resolution of 16 February 2017 on delayed 
implementation of ESI Funds operational programmes – impact on Cohesion policy and the way forward (P8_TA-
PROV(2017)0055); European Parliament (2016a) Resolution of 11 May 2016 on acceleration of implementation 
of Cohesion policy (P8_TA(2016)0217); European Parliament (2016b), Resolution of 6 July 2016 on synergies 
for innovation: the European Structural and Investment Funds, Horizon 2020 and other European innovation 
funds and EU programmes (P8_TA(2016)0311); and European Parliament (2015) Resolution of 26 November 
2015 ‘Towards simplification and performance orientation in Cohesion policy 2014-2020’ (P8_TA(2015)0419). 
29  ‘High Level Group of Independent Experts on Monitoring Simplification for Beneficiaries of the European 
Structural and Investment Funds’. 
30  These include e-governance, simplified cost options, easier access to EU funding for SMEs, financial instruments, 
gold-plating, and control and audit. 
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• The Better Regulation Agenda. Cutting across these issues is the Commission’s 
‘Better Regulation Agenda’, a package of reforms adopted in 2015 to boost 
transparency in the EU decision-making process, improve the quality of new laws 
through better impact assessments of draft legislation, and promote constant and 
consistent review of existing EU laws, so that EU policies achieve their objectives in 
the most effective and efficient way. As part of this, the REFIT Platform brings together 
the Commission, national authorities and other stakeholders in regular meetings to 
improve existing EU legislation. The aim is to keep the entire stock of EU legislation 
under review and ensure that regulatory burdens are minimised and that all 
simplification options are identified and applied.31 
 
• Omnibus Regulation. At the end of 2016, the Commission, in the framework of the 
mid-term review/revision of the multiannual financial framework (MFF) 2014-20, 
proposed a new Omnibus regulation, amending several regulations on the 
implementation of EU policies in 2014-20 (including the CPR applicable to Cohesion 
policy) and the financial rules applicable to the general budget, with the stated goal 
of pursuing further simplification and flexibility for remainder of the programming 
period (2017-20).32 In this new proposal, the Commission restated that sound 
financial management remains a key objective of EU financial rules and that the new 
regulation strengthens the systems in place to protect the EU budget against fraud 
and financial irregularities, and contributes to reduce the administrative burden of 
programme implementation and the number of errors, in so doing also supporting a 
higher impact of EU policies on the ground.33  
 
The Omnibus regulation proposal is anticipated to enter into force in 2018. The draft Omnibus 
regulation highlights basic aims and principles designed to strengthen simplification in the 
rest of the 2014-2020 period (Table 2):   
Table 2: ESIF simplification and financial control 2014-20 – current measures and 
proposed changes 
Aim Measure 
From multiple layers of 
controls to cross reliance 
on audit, assessment or 
authorisation, and 
harmonisation of reporting 
requirements 
 
Increased reliance on one single audit, assessment or 
authorisation (e.g. conformity to State aids rules), when 
conditions are met to be taken into account in the EU 
system 
Increased reliance on implementing partners’ own 
procedures once these have been positively assessed 
(i.e. European Investment bank - EIB, International 
Monetary Fund, promotional banks, NGOs etc.) 
Signature of financial framework partnership 
agreements with long term partners to improve 
harmonisation of audit, reporting and other 
                                           
31  European Commission (2015) Commission Staff Working Document – Better Regulation Guidelines. Document 
SWD(2015) 111 final. 
32  European Commission (2016b) Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, Brussels, 14.9.2016, COM(2016) 605 final, 
2016/0282 (COD). 
33  European Commission (2016a) Op. cit., p. 3. 
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Aim Measure 
administrative requirements (Omnibus Title V Articles 
122, 123 and 126) 
More effective use of 
financial instruments: 
Including through ensuring a level playing field among 
key EU implementing partners and reducing burdensome 
requirements related to publication of individual data of 
final recipients or to the exclusion criteria. 
Simplified accounting 
Increased use of simplified cost options, lump sums, 
prizes, payment based on output and results (Article 
121, Omnibus Title XIII) 
Harmonised rules across 
funds 
Application of only one set of rules when combining 
different funding sources (e.g. ESIF, EFSI and financial 
instruments (Omnibus Title V) 
Focus on results and 
streamlining of reporting: 
the proposal includes a 
series of measures aimed 
at. 
focusing better the budget on results, establishing a 
clear performance framework, enhancing transparency 
and streamlining reporting  
Simplified rules for 
beneficiaries in relation to 
grants  
For example, removal of non-cumulative award check 
for low-value grants and of the non-profit principle; 
simpler rules for ‘contribution in kind’ valuation; grant 
awards without calls for proposal under specific 
conditions, simplified forms of grants (Omnibus Title 
VIII) 
Simpler and leaner EU 
administration: the 
proposal provides for  
A series of simplification proposals aiming to allow EU 
institutions to work more efficiently, notably by 
implementing jointly administrative appropriations to 
achieve economies of scale. 
Source:  Commission proposal on the “Omnibus regulation”.34 
 
At the time of writing, the content of the Omnibus is still being finalised. However, it is 
possible to highlight some concrete proposals that indicate the broader direction of travel: 
• The pursuit of simplification measures for specific types of operation. This 
includes regulatory provisions for financial instruments: no ‘on the spot’ verifications 
for the European Investment Bank or other international financial institutions; 
extended power for the Commission to set the model for the reporting of FIs in control 
and audit reports; and allowing an irregularity to be replaced by regular expenditure 
within the same FI operation to avoid net loss.  Reduce the administrative burden for 
                                           
34  European Commission (2016b) Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union and amending Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002, 
Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, EU No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1305/2013, 
(EU) No 1306/2013, (EU) No 1307/2013, (EU) No 1308/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 
223/2014,(EU) No 283/2014, (EU) No 652/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Decision No 
541/2014/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, Brussels, 14.9.2016, COM(2016) 605 final, 
2016/0282 (COD). 
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revenue generating operations by raising the threshold exempting operations from 
calculating and taking account of revenue generation during implementation. 
 
• Extending the use of Simplified Cost Options. This includes promoting of the use 
of lump sums by removing the upper limit of EUR 100 000 of public contribution; 
reducing the administrative burden associated with the use of SCOs by basing on 
conditions other than costs. (e.g. fulfilment of conditions related to implementation 
or the achievement of programme objectives); the obligatory use of standard scales 
of unit costs, lump sums or flat rates for operations below a certain threshold for ERDF 
and ESF.; and increased use of flat rates that do not require MS to establish a 
methodology.  
 
• Strengthening the ‘Single Audit’ principle. The ‘Single Audit’ principle should be 
reinforced and the thresholds below which operations are not subject to more than 
one audit should be doubled.35 
Thus, it is possible to identify a series of initiatives that have been designed to improve 
ESIF performance by breaking the ‘vicious cycle’ of complexity, balancing 
requirements for sound financial control with the need for simplification. In order to 
assess these initiatives, Section 3 sets out in more detail the ESIF system for financial control 
and audit and identifies where most complexity arises.  
 
 
 
  
                                           
35  Under Article 148 of the CPR, operations for which the total eligible expenditure does not exceed EUR 200 000 
for the ERDF and the Cohesion Fund, EUR 150 000 for the ESF or EUR 100 000 for the EMFF should not be 
subject to more than one audit by either the audit authority or the Commission prior to the submission of the 
accounts for the accounting year in which the operation is completed.  
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3.  IDENTIFYING COMPLEXITY 
SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS 
• The ESIF ‘shared management’ model involves a number of EU and Member State 
level bodies in multiple controls. The European Court of Auditors, as the EU’s external, 
independent auditor, plays a particularly crucial part in ensuring sound financial 
management, accountability and transparency. It is currently trialling a new approach 
to the auditing of the EU Budget, focusing on the results of audits carried out by the 
Commission and MS audit institutions, and on net (residual) error rates. This new 
approach is being piloted on Cohesion policy for the expenditure of the financial year 
2017 and results will be reported in the Court’s Annual Report 2018. It is intended to 
streamline the overall auditing process and reduce duplications. 
• Coordination challenges between different audit institutions are being addressed also 
with methodological harmonisation and administrative arrangements, while an 
increased use of performance audits and tolerable error rates are also being 
discussed.  
• Assessing the complexity of ESIF control and audit systems requires the 
disaggregation of different responsibilities across the EU and MS levels.  
• The two tasks perceived by MAs to be the most complex are the designation process 
and the annual summaries.  
• Designation is taking a very long time across all EU Member States, which in turn is 
leading to delays in financial implementation because only advance payments can be 
made until designation is complete. In theory, the designation process should not 
create excessive complexity, as provisions for proportionality were included. However, 
Member States have preferred a ‘heavy’ procedure to guarantee assurance and limit 
the scope for retroactive audit measures. The designation procedure has been more 
time-consuming and complicated than in 2007-13.  
• Administrative verifications also create considerable burden and complexity and could 
be made more proportionate. MAs have also struggled to comply with their new anti-
fraud responsibilities, which have been cumbersome to deliver and required training 
and resources. 
• AAs identify most complexity with the production of annual reports under Article 
59(5)(b) of the Financial Regulation. Systems audit also requires significant capacity, 
especially in large or complicated programmes (including ETC programmes).  
• Statistically representative sampling creates more assurance but makes audit work 
more complicated. Some AAs acknowledge that the Commission has provided 
guidance on approaches to developing samples, but find the various methodologies 
complex.  
• The requirement for annual audit reports lessens complexity at the end of programme 
periods but creates time pressures. Some AAs saw the reduction in the time allocated 
for sending the control report and audit opinion to the Commission, from one year to 
around 6-8 months, as the most complex problem they are facing. 
• The degree of complexity generated by audit requirements varies in terms of what is 
being audited. Certain types of programmes (ETC) or operations (e.g. revenue-
generating projects, FIs) are more complicated.  
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• Complexity also varies in function of domestic institutional choices. Administrative 
stability tends to constrain complexity: the risk of error and complexity in financial 
control and audit increases where institutional arrangements are in flux or staff 
turnover is high. 
• At EU level, lack of a standardised approach to the regulations governing EU 
instruments under shared management (ESIF) and direct management (e.g. COSME, 
Horizon 2020) constrains the pursuit of synergies and creates complexity. 
• A common cause of complexity noted by programme authorities is the provision of EU 
guidance in untimely and fragmented manner, which leads to lack of legal certainty 
and ambiguity.  
• Coordination and consistency in audits is crucial in limiting complexity, given the 
different levels of control to which ESIF programmes and operations are subject. The 
role of the European Commission and ECA is important in this. A number of current 
initiatives are aiming to increase the cooperation between the Commission and the 
ECA in developing consistent methodological approaches and in drawing on each 
other’s results. 
3.1 What does ESIF financial control and audit involve?  
The ESIF ‘shared management’ model involves EU and Member State level bodies in multiple 
controls (see Figure 2). This process is designed to strengthen the assurance that ESIF 
transactions are legal and regular and to reinforce the accountability of MS in the audit 
process throughout the programming period (e.g. through the description and assessment 
of management and control systems at the outset of the period, various levels of controls at 
national and programme levels during implementation and a final control report in the closure 
package). 
Figure 2: ESIF assurance model 2014-2020 
  
Source:  Byrne, D. (2014) ‘Management and control systems’ presentation organised by EIPA-Ecorys-PwC, 
Brussels, September 2014. 
Thus ESIF financial control and audit occurs at different levels: 
At MS level: In 2014-20, MS have been required to provide ex-ante assurance on the set-
up and design of the management & control system, confirming that programme authorities 
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are in a position to fulfil their responsibilities, building on audit and control work carried out 
under the previous period. This requires designation of a Managing Authority (MA), a 
Certifying Authority (CA) and an Audit Authority for each Operational Programme (OP), 
describing the relative responsibilities and functions in dedicated documents, outlining the 
management and control systems in place for the programme.36  
• Managing Authorities carry out first‑level checks of operations (management 
verifications) and the expenditure declared before the expenditure is certified by the 
Certifying Authority, where present, as legal and regular.  
 
• Certifying Authorities, where present, are generally placed within national 
Ministries of Finances, or within internal control bodies of sectoral ministries or 
regional authorities. They are responsible for making declarations to the Commission 
and verifying the accuracy of programme accounts. 
 
• Audit Authorities provide assurance to the Commission regarding the effective 
functioning of the management systems and internal controls for an OP (and, as a 
consequence, the legality and regularity of the expenditure certified). They must be 
functionally independent from the bodies managing the funds. In most cases the audit 
authorities are separate departments within State chancelleries, Ministries of Finance 
(or internal control bodies under ministry authority), other ministries or Supreme 
Audit Institutions.  
 
At EU level, Commission bodies carry out control and audit activities, including 
system audits and audits of samples of operations. DG Regional Policy and DG Employment 
have units focused exclusively on audit and country desks are also involved in issues relating 
to financial management, control and audit.  
As the EU’s external auditor, the ECA plays a crucial part in ensuring sound financial 
management, accountability and transparency. For ESIF, audit by the ECA involves: 
checking individual transactions (the annual report on the implementation of the EU budget); 
assessing the operations of EU institutions (annual reports on the institutions and agencies); 
and, reviewing the effectiveness of policy initiatives (special reports). Within this, the Court 
realises three distinct but complementary types of audits:37 
• Financial Audit. ECA Annual reports verify whether financial information presented by the 
responsible authorities is in accordance with the applicable financial reporting 
framework and whether incorrectly calculated costs were claimed in respect of 
projects co-financed by the EU. This is accomplished by obtaining sufficient and 
appropriate audit evidence to enable the auditor to express an opinion as to whether 
the financial information is free from material misstatement or miscalculation. 
• Compliance Audit. The ECA Annual Report on revenue and expenditure of Cohesion 
policy contains a ‘statement of assurance’, certifying the reliability of the accounts and 
the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions. This includes an estimation 
of the most likely error rate in reporting of financial transactions, based on a 
statistically representative sample of ESIF transactions relating to both revenue and 
                                           
36  Although MS can opt to subsume CA functions under the Managing Authority and/or designated Implementing 
Bodies (Art. 106 CPR). 
37  Karakatsanis G and Weber M (2016) Op. cit. See also INTOSAI (no date) ISSAI 100. Fundamental Principles of 
Public-Sector Auditing, available at http://www.issai.org/en_us/site-issai/issai-framework/3-fundamental-
auditing-priciples.htm. 
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expenditure, down to beneficiary level. The second main source of audit evidence is 
the verification of the effectiveness of the internal control systems applied by the EU 
institutions and MS.  
 
• Performance Audit. Over the past two decades, the Court has gradually 
incorporated audit work that focuses on the results and impact of Cohesion policy, 
establishing and further developing its performance audit practice. Performance audits 
are summarised in special reports and in separate sections of the annual report. 
Special reports can cover compliance and performance audits. Those covering 
performance audit can deal with specific aspects of ESIF implementation - such as 
closure, the negotiations of Partnership Agreements and Operational Programmes, 
the ex ante conditionalities and performance reserve38 or specific themes, such as 
airport infrastructure or youth unemployment.39  
 
The Court also prepares opinions on legislative proposals, either on its own initiative or at 
the request of the Commission, the European Parliament and the Council. 
Thus, ESIF’s ‘shared management’ model creates a complex system of multiple checks where 
EU, MS and programme-level bodies participate in a range of internal and external controls 
(see Figure 3 for a visual description of the OPs’ management and control systems).  
• Internal controls are realised by the authorities responsible for correct management 
and disbursement of the funds (Managing Authorities, Implementing Bodies (IB), 
Certifying Authorities). These activities include: 
 
• management verifications by MAs 
• certification of expenditure by the Certifying Authorities (which, where 
appointed, are responsible for certifying the completeness, accuracy and 
veracity of payment declarations, that the expenditure complies with 
applicable EU and national rules, and assert that the expenditure declared 
has been duly verified by the MAs). 
 
• Internal audits comprise: 
 
• the systems audit realised by the Audit Authority for each programme  
• the financial and compliance audits carried out by programmes’ Audit 
Authorities. These are functionally independent from the authorities 
managing the funds and, in addition to systems audits, also realise audits 
on a sample of operations and selected functions of the management 
system, and  
• the audits carried out by the Commission (Art. 68 CPR). 
 
                                           
38  European Court of Auditors (2016) An assessment of the arrangements for closure of the 2007-2013 cohesion 
and rural development programmes, Special report N°36/2016; European Court of Auditors (2017) The 
Commission’s negotiation of 2014-2020 Partnership Agreements and programmes in Cohesion, Special report 
N°2/2017; European Court of Auditors (2017) Ex ante conditionalities and performance reserve in Cohesion: 
innovative but not yet effective instruments, Special report N°15/2017. 
39  European Court of Auditors (2017) Youth unemployment – have EU policies made a difference? An assessment 
of the Youth Guarantee and the Youth Employment Initiative, Special Report N°5/2017; European Court of 
Auditors (2014) EU-funded airport infrastructures: poor value for money, Special Report N°21/2014. 
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• External audits are the audits carried out by Supreme audit institutions, i.e. 
national/sub-national Courts and the ECA, i.e. by external audit bodies, which are not 
part of the executive branch of government.40  
Figure 3: Management and control system for OPs 
 
Source: European Court of Auditors (2013) Taking stock of ‘single audit’ and the Commission's reliance on the 
work of national audit authorities in cohesion, Special Report No. 16, 2013. 
Within this, the role of the ECA requires specific attention. Over successive 
programming periods, the dynamic of Cohesion policy has been driven by the need to 
improve legality and regularity and the Court is part of multiple layers of audit in an effort to 
reduce the error rate. As the EU’s external auditor, the ECA’s key remit is to ‘provide impartial 
information to the EU’s legislative authorities (that is, the European Parliament and the 
Council) and to the wider public on how the EU budget is spent. Based on its mandate, it 
examines the EU’s financial management and assesses whether EU policies and programmes 
achieve their intended objectives (European Union 2012: Art. 287)’.41 
As part of its annual reports on the implementation of the European Budget, the ECA 
publishes a specific assessment on Cohesion policy (as it does also for other main policy 
areas funded by the EU budget). Each year, for each specific assessment of Cohesion policy, 
the ECA examines a sample of between 150-180 transactions, including ‘on-the-spot’ 
inspections of selected projects. The Court’s testing includes the entire project cycle and 
covers compliance with the applicable EU and national rules (including state aid and public 
procurement).42 In addition, the ECA examines the reliability of annual control reports 
submitted by AAs to the Commission (sometimes re-running a sample of audits to check the 
accuracy and reliability of the AAs’ work). Moreover, every year, the Court ‘reviews the 
Commission’s annual activity reports and assesses the Commission’s supervision of the 
                                           
40 Karakatsanis G and Weber M (2016) Op. cit. 
41  Ibid, p. 171. 
42  Weber M and Gantzer-Houzel S (2014) ‘Risk of Non-compliance with State Aid Rules in Cohesion policy Lessons 
Learnt from the 2007-2013 Period’, European Structural and Investment Funds Journal, Volume 2 (2014), Issue 
2. 
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national audit authorities’.43 These seemingly numerous checks are a result of the 
independence of different levels of audit, set out in the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU: 
the ECA and national audit bodies must cooperate in a spirit of trust while maintaining their 
independence (TFEU Article 248 (3)). It should be noted, however, that that the number of 
ECA (and also of Commission) Cohesion policy audits is very small compared to the number 
of audits carried out by MS authorities. For instance, in the period 2010-2014, the ECA 
audited 1 573 ERDF, CP and ESF operations:44 in 2015 alone, MS authorities audited a total 
of 12 270 operations.45 It should also be noted that, starting with the expenditure of 2017, 
the Court is piloting a change in its approach to the auditing of the EU Budget, which entails 
a focus on the results of audits carried out by the Commission and MS audit institutions, and 
on net (residual) error rates (i.e. errors after the actions taken to address them). This new 
approach is being piloted on Cohesion policy in relation to the expenditure of the financial 
year 2017. In practice, the Court is testing ‘the accuracy of the information provided by the 
European Commission on the legality and regularity of Cohesion spending’ by examining ‘the 
checks already carried out by the European Commission and by the audit authorities in 
Members States, through a review of audit files and the re-performance of audit work carried 
out at beneficiary level’, in order to conclude whether the residual total error rates reported 
by the Commission, are reliable.46 This is intended to streamline the overall auditing process 
and reduce duplications. Results of this pilot will be reported in the Court’s Annual Report 
2018 and, if successful, the approach will be continued and extended to other policy areas 
as well.  
A related issue is the calculation of the materiality threshold of tolerable error for 
Cohesion policy. This concerns achieving consensus on an acceptable level of error (i.e. 
breaches of rules in using Cohesion policy funds, expressed as a percentage of the funds 
spent) and on the methodologies used to calculate these rates. Critics have questioned the 
value of substantial resources being used to deliver a single overall error rate per policy 
area.47 Moreover, studies suggest that the cost of financial accountability mechanisms needs 
to be taken into account when designing systems because these costs can outweigh potential 
benefits in terms of increased efficiency or reduced corruption.48 In this context, it is 
important to note the aforementioned Court’s performance audits. Alongside 
compliance audits, performance audits have value in a number of respects: in informing the 
Court’s role in making recommendations on how to improve the ‘value for money’, efficiency 
and effectiveness of ESIF, in identifying specific ESIF implementation issues or themes where 
simplification could be beneficial, and in incentivising programme authorities to focus on 
results away from a focus mainly on error rates. Thus, there is an argument that a stronger 
focus on performance auditing can produce better assessment of the efficiency and 
effectiveness of operations and contribute indirectly to proposals for simplification, by 
pointing to aspects of management that are not effective.49 While the growing use of 
performance audits by the ECA’ has been noted over the past two decades50, there has been 
an increased focus on this type of audit in the last 5-10 years. Moreover, to avoid duplication 
                                           
43  Karakatsanis G and Weber M (2016) Op. cit., p. 179. 
44  ECA (2016c) More efforts needed to raise awareness of and enforce compliance with State aid rules in cohesion 
policy, Special Report 24/2016.  
45  Sébert F (2016) ‘Audit of ESF and ERDF ‘, presentation at High Level Expert Group meeting 29/11/2016. 
46  European Court of Auditors (2017) Background paper: The ECA’s modified approach to the Statement of 
Assurance audits in Cohesion, 14.12.2017, p. 1. 
47  Stephenson P (2015) ‘Reconciling audit and evaluation? The shift to performance and effectiveness at the 
European Court of Auditors’. European Journal of Risk Regulation, 6, 79-89. 
48  Mulgan R (2003) Holding Power to Account: Accountability in Modern Democracies, Palgrave MacMillan, New 
York. 
49  European Parliament (2015) Towards simplification and performance orientation in Cohesion policy 2014-2020 
(2015/2772(RSP) European Parliament resolution of 26 November 2015 
50  Stephenson P (2015) Op. cit. 
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it is important to clearly differentiate between ESIF performance audits and evaluations as 
both can have similar goals and use similar methods.  
The Court is involved in administrative arrangements that seek to address 
coordination challenges and these should also be noted. Cooperation between the Court 
and national audit institutions takes place within the framework of a Contact Committee, 
composed of the Heads of the national audit authorities and the Court. The Committee has 
established working groups, including one to oversee parallel studies on the management of 
Structural Funds in the MS. It should be noted that this coordination and cooperation can 
produce valuable results but it is a time-consuming process, particularly given the varied 
needs and capacities of audit systems across MS. Thus, in debates about the 
simplification of audit, the issue of increased coordination and reliance on each 
others’ work, between EU and MS levels, is crucial. 
Assessing the complexity of ESIF control and audit systems requires the 
disaggregation of different responsibilities across the EU and MS levels. It is 
important to identify the specific location of the most complex tasks. Table 3 sets out an 
indicative list of control and audit tasks for the ECA, MAs, CAs and AAs. 
Table 3:  Audit and control tasks of ESIF programme authorities 
MA CA 
AA 
 
MA responsible for managing 
and implementing OP with 
‘sound financial control’ 
Submitting payment 
applications to 
Commission 
Give an Audit Opinion on 
designation of CA, MA 
 
Projects comply with 
Community and National 
rules 
Drawing up the 
accounts 
Prepare an audit strategy  
Expenditure declared by 
beneficiaries has actually 
been incurred 
Ensuring existence of 
computerized 
accounting records for 
each 
operation 
Carry out audits on systems 
On-the-spot (management) 
verifications may be carried 
out on a sample basis 
 
Select sample in reference to 
the accounting year 
Ensure there is a system to 
record/store accounting 
records for each project 
 
Carry out audits on operations 
Collect information on 
financial management, 
monitoring, verifications, 
evaluation and audit 
 
Carry out audits of the 
accounts certified by CA 
Draw up and submit annual & 
final reports on 
implementation 
 
Report to EC by 15th February 
each year, providing a control 
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MA CA 
AA 
 
report and audit opinion on 
accounts 
Effective and proportionate 
anti-fraud measures  
 
Drawing up a management 
declaration on the functioning 
of the 
systems, legality and 
regularity of transactions and 
sound financial 
management 
 
 
Drawing up an annual 
summary of final audit 
reports and verifications 
and controls carried out, 
analysis of nature of errors 
and corrective 
actions taken or to be taken 
 
 
Report to EC by 15 February 
each year 
(Art.59(5)(b) Financial 
Regulation) 
 
 
Source:  Based on Byrne, D. (2014) ‘Management and control systems’ presentation organised by EIPA-Ecorys-
PwC under the Framework Contract, Brussels, September 2014. 
 
 
3.2.  Functions of the Managing Authority 
MA functions in the field of financial control and audit relate to: the designation procedure 
(to ensure that the MA and CA have the necessary and appropriate management and control 
systems set up from the start of the period); management verifications (including 
administrative verifications and ‘on the spot’ checks); anti-fraud measures; management 
declarations; annual summaries (of accounts on the expenditure that was incurred and audit 
and control procedures); and annual implementation reports. Figure 4 provides a summary 
of the views of the actors interviewed from the MAs of the seven case study OPs in relation 
to the level of complexity associated with these tasks. Interviewees were asked to rate the 
perceived complexity of each task on a scale 1 (limited complexity) to 5 (extreme 
complexity), and to discuss the reasons for their assessments. 
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Figure 4: Complexities facing MAs, case study views 
 
Source:  Case study research. 
As Figure 4 shows, the two tasks perceived by MAs to be the most complex were the 
designation process and the annual summaries. The challenges associated with the 
designation procedure are explored in Section 3.4.1. MA views on the other tasks listed are 
set out below. 
3.2.1 Management verifications (Art. 125 (4a), (5a), 5(b) CPR) 
Under the CPR, MAs are required to verify that the ESIF co-financed products and services 
have been delivered and that expenditure declared by the beneficiaries has been paid and 
that it complies with applicable law, the Commission decision approving the OP and the 
conditions for support of the operation. This requirement involves administrative and ‘on the 
spot’ verifications.  
• Administrative verifications create considerable burden and complexity and 
could be made more proportionate. These must be carried out for each application 
for reimbursement by beneficiaries, based on an examination of the claim and 
supporting documentation. In the view of some programme authorities, 
administrative verifications in respect of each application for reimbursement creates 
substantial complexity: the current system requires in essence, that eligibility of each 
euro in each invoice is verified, involving long checklists and substantial 
documentation. This brings the error rate down but with the cost of high bureaucracy. 
Commission guidance recognises that verification of each individual expenditure item 
against source documentation, although desirable, may not be practical. It allows, 
where justified, selection of the expenditure items to be verified within each 
application for reimbursement, to be based on a sample of transactions, selected 
taking account of risk factors (value of items, type of beneficiary, past experience), 
and complemented by a random sample. Nevertheless, Member States are wary of 
incurring future audit penalties and often carry out comprehensive verifications. 
Verifications, including those based on random sampling, are particularly complex in 
programmes that include a large number of small projects (noticeable, for instance in 
ESF-funded programmes). According to interview evidence, timely verification of 
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expenditure in these cases has particular challenges for MAs and IBs, including 
providing support to beneficiaries to present this expenditure in an organised and 
clear manner.  
 
• This process can be further complicated in programmes with several IBs as 
the MA is required to obtain assurance by performing quality checks on samples of 
verifications carried out by IBs. For some MAs interviewed, complexity is exacerbated 
by delayed and unclear regulations and guidance from the Commission. Beneficiaries 
and programme authorities would like to avoid dealing with an inordinately large 
volume of documentation and there is potential to introduce more proportional 
arrangements, for instance drawing on the findings of other external controls or 
requesting only the supporting documentation in respect of the sample of expenditure 
items selected for verification. However, there is concern that following audits, such 
approaches will incur penalties. 
 
• ‘On the spot’ verifications are proportionate and less problematic. The 
frequency and coverage of the ‘on-the-spot’ verifications is proportionate to the 
amount of public support given to an operation and to the level of risk identified by 
such verifications and audits of the management and control system as a whole. This 
means that the number of ‘on the spot’ visits is based on sampling and is limited. 
However, some problems were apparent where annual audit summary deadlines are 
pending and where ‘on-the-spot’ verifications have to be finalised in a short period of 
time in order to be included. In specific cases, the limited capacity of some programme 
bodies, especially where programme management and implementation structures 
have changed between programme periods has caused difficulties.  
 
3.2.2 Anti-fraud measures (Art. 125 (4c) CPR) 
• Anti-fraud measures have been cumbersome to deliver and there has been 
limited application of Commission initiatives. This is a new function for MAs and 
introduces additional responsibilities with legal consequences and additional workload 
in comparison to the previous programming period. The Arachne initiative has been 
designed to aid programme authorities in this work. It is a risk scoring tool developed 
by the European Commission in close cooperation with some Member States. The 
Commission services aim at supporting ESIF MAs with this Risk Scoring Tool to identify 
effectively and efficiently most risky projects, contracts, contractors and beneficiaries, 
necessary for their management verifications. For several reasons, the MAs 
interviewed have struggled to adapt to this new responsibility. First, it is based on a 
number of different regulations (e.g. CPR - 1303/2013, FRR - 966/2012, delegated 
regulations: 480/2014, 1268/2012 2015/1970, implementing regulation 2015/1974), 
several of which have undergone revisions and related guidance is also open to 
misinterpretation. It is complex to create and implement the anti-fraud system that 
will fit all kinds of projects in diversified fields and all types of beneficiaries. There are 
specific challenges in carrying out these tasks for ETC programmes. This requires 
putting together methodologies to check and prevent fraud in all the partner 
countries, involving the drafting of many procedures and spending a disproportionate 
amount of resources for programmes that often have limited budgets. The 
Commission guidance document on anti-fraud measures does not take into account 
the specific ETC context.  
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3.2.3 Management declaration and annual summary (Article 125 (4e) CPR)  
• Annual reporting has benefits but further streamlining is needed. The drafting 
of an annual management declaration and summary of the final audit reports and of 
controls carried out is a new responsibility for MAs. Annual reporting is appreciated in 
principle by programme authorities. It offers a more structured approach to creating 
assurance over the programming period and addresses some of the complexity 
encountered at programme closure as there is a tendency for issues to accumulate at 
the end of the period. Nevertheless, it is challenging for programme authorities to 
implement as it has a rigid logic and timeframe that does not follow the ‘real’ timeline 
of projects. According to interviewees, MAs and IBs face problems updating 
information as controls and audits are ongoing throughout the year. In some cases, 
late publication of Commission guidelines and the need to adapt IT systems to collect 
data has put additional time pressure on programme authorities. Some programme 
authorities interviewed identify unnecessary complexity through duplication or 
overlaps between this task and the Annual Control report prepared by the Audit 
Authority. 
 
3.3 Functions of the Audit Authority 
Audit Authority functions consist of: providing an opinion on designation of the MA and CA, 
developing an audit strategy, carrying out systems audits, audits on operations, audits of 
accounts and providing an annual summary of the final audit reports and of controls carried 
out. Figure 5 provides a summary of the views of the actors interviewed from the AAs of the 
seven case study OPs in relation to the level of complexity associated with these tasks. 
Interviewees were asked to rate the perceived complexity of each task on a scale 1 (limited 
complexity) to 5 (extreme complexity), and to discuss the reasons for their assessments. As 
Figure 5 shows, AAs identify most complexity with the production of annual reports under 
Article 59(5)(b) of the Financial Regulation. AA views on this and other tasks listed are set 
out below. 
 
Figure 5:  Complexities facing AAs, case study views 
 
Source:  Case study research. 
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3.3.1  Give an Audit Opinion on designation of CA and MA and preparation of an audit 
strategy 
• Coordination of these tasks among programme authorities has been challenging, 
given the level of detail indicated by EC guidance notes. In some cases, MAs submitted 
descriptions of the management and control systems to AAs at a very late stage, 
giving limited time for giving an audit opinion. These tasks can be particularly 
complex for trans-national programmes that utilise ERDF as well as IPA 
funds (as is the case of the ADRION programme analysed in this study). The 
involvement of different actors from various countries requires more complex 
governance arrangements. The audit strategy of the ADRION programme, for 
example, was prepared by the AA with the support of a so-called ‘group of auditors’ 
(GOA). This includes a member from each country represented in the programme. 
Audit work carried out under the programme is always agreed with this group.51 The 
AA is now selecting a third party that will be charged with the realisation of audits in 
all the countries involved in the programme. In each country, this actor will have to 
liaise/coordinate with the GOA (e.g. for an audit in Croatia, consulting the Croatian 
GOA member before launching the audit and so on). This is creating an additional 
burden both from the perspective of the preparation of the audit strategy (which is 
more complex) and in terms of the task itself, not least for the challenge entailed in 
identifying an organisation with capability to operate across the entire programme 
area. The necessity to put in place such complex arrangements is also causing delays: 
an already long and stringent timetable is made worse by this complexity. 
 
3.3.2  Carry out audits on systems 
• Systems audit requires significant capacity, especially in large, complex 
programmes. Carrying out audits of systems and operations demands significant 
capacity and experience in AAs, especially in programmes such as the OP 
Infrastructure and Environment where there are a large number of operations, many 
of which involve complex, major infrastructure projects. Several AAs place significant 
emphasis on the audit of management and control systems as they can then draw 
assurance that the operations selected for implementation, even if they are complex 
and potentially risky, are likely to be implemented successfully. 
 
3.3.3  Carry out audits on operations 
• Statistically representative sampling creates more assurance but makes 
audit work more complex. Article 28 of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) no 
480/2014 sets a methodology for the selection of the sample of operations. This calls 
for the AA to draw a statistically representative sample from the population of 
operations covered. Non-statistical sampling can be applied, but must be justified to 
the Commission, must cover a minimum of 5% operations and 10% of the expenditure 
declared, and the AA must be able to extrapolate the results to the population from 
which the sample was drawn. Statistically representative sampling aligns ESIF 
auditing approaches with internationally accepted standards and it also makes the 
conclusions of audit reports more robust. Nevertheless, it makes the work of AAs 
demanding, notably through the requirement that AAs submit opinions based on a 
                                           
51  Regulation (EU) No 1299/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 on specific 
provisions for the support from the European Regional Development Fund to the European territorial cooperation 
goal. 
Control and simplification of procedures within ESIF 
___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
43 
statistically representative samples of operations. Some AAs acknowledge that the 
Commission has provided guidance on approaches to developing samples, but find 
the various methodologies complex. Nevertheless a question remains if programmes 
could do with simple random sampling, without aiming for the complex extrapolation 
methods required by the current regulatory framework. Constraining the scope for 
non-statistical (for instance, ‘risk based’) sampling limits opportunities for 
proportionality. This applies particularly to programmes with many beneficiaries using 
relatively small levels of funding. 
 
3.3.4 Annual control report and audit opinion on accounts 
 
• The requirement for annual audit reports lessens complexity at the end of 
programme periods but creates time pressures. Every year the AAs must issue 
an annual control report, giving their opinion with reference to the results of the 
audits. Representatives of AAs interviewed recognised benefits in ‘annual closure': it 
eases administrative burdens at the end of the programme period and addresses the 
accumulation of problems at the stage of programme closure. On the other hand, it 
creates time pressures in compiling the report every year and ensuring the inclusion 
of the relevant audit results. The time frame between certification of accounts on 1 
July, and submission of the audit opinion and annual control report by 15 February 
the following year is very tight for delivering the audits, doing the contradictory phase, 
putting into practice action plans and ensuring the necessary follow-up. This challenge 
has been exacerbated by changing guidelines from the Commission, with increasing 
level of detail required in Annual Reports. Some AAs saw the reduction in the time 
allocated for sending the control report and audit opinion to the Commission, 
from one year to around 6-8 months, as the most complex problem they are 
facing. 
 
3.4 Cross-cutting issues 
3.4.1  Designation Procedure 
For 2014-20, a new national designation process for the MA was established. In contrast to 
2007-13, this designation process was only to be reviewed by the Commission in three cases: 
where the total amount of support from ESIF under the related programme exceeds a certain 
amount, following a risk analysis or at the Member State’s initiative. It was to be a largely 
formal, ‘tick box’ process, and MS could simplify the process if the system was the same as 
that used in 2007-13.  
• Designation does not really provide complete assurance on the functioning 
of systems. It is important to have a designation process but interviewees 
emphasised that this should not be seen as an assurance of robust systems for the 
entire programming period. The system may appear robust but this may only be a 
‘snapshot’ at a particular time. In some Member States, there is considerable flux and 
it is challenging to get assurance as systems are modified. 
 
• Designation is seen as more complex than in 2007-13, with lengthy guidance 
and checklists provided by the Commission, so that the process is seen to be at least 
as complex as the process of drafting and agreeing the OP itself. The rules are 
seen as unclear, partly because there are so many different EU documents 
(regulations, delegated and implementing acts, guidelines…) so that OP authorities 
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need to combine rules from different documents in order to understand what needs 
to be done.  
 
• Designation is taking a very long time across all EU Member States, which in 
turn is leading to delays in financial implementation because only advance 
payments can be made until designation is complete. 
 
• In theory, the designation process should not create excessive complexity: provisions 
for proportionality were included. However, Member States have preferred a 
‘heavy’ procedure to guarantee assurance and limit the scope for retroactive 
audit measures. In practice, MS have tended to go for a ‘heavier’ approach and call 
for Commission reviews. This not only contributes to complexity for programme 
authorities (i.e. responding to Commission checks) but also puts a strain on 
Commission capacity as it is stretched to cover many programmes. This approach can 
be the result of risk aversion, a cautious approach from MS and programme 
authorities, based on concern about future controls and penalties.  
• Replacing Commission with MS approval of designation does not mean 
simplification: the procedure is more time-consuming and labour-intensive 
than in 2007-13. According to some MAs, disproportionate work is needed to 
document and approve the management and control system. The quantity of 
documentation required and the degree of detail required has increased compared to 
2007-13. For some programme authorities, the checklist for the designation report is 
excessive and goes beyond regulatory requirement. There is also some duplication 
with the systems audit. Addressing these challenges has created delays in the 
designation process which in turn has held back the launch of some OPs, with negative 
implications for performance.  
• The procedure does not take into consideration the specificity of ETC and 
especially the fact that the MA is representing several MS. Compared to 
mainstream programmes, the analysis of the management and control systems is 
more complex, due to the many systems and actors involved, from different countries 
(some of which, in the particular case of the case study programme reviewed, are 
outside the EU). 
• More fundamentally, the allocation of responsibility to Member State 
authorities creates additional challenges. Lines of accountability between 
Member State audit authorities, the Commission and the ECA can be unclear given 
the lack of legal clarity and certainty over some rules. 
3.4.2  Types of operation 
It is also important to note that the degree of complexity varies in terms of what is 
being audited. Some operations are more straightforward (e.g. with limited scope for error 
in terms of eligibility) but there are complexity issues with specific types of project: 
• Management and control of Financial Instruments and revenue-generating 
projects is inevitably complex and the capacity and experience of programme 
authorities (and Commission bodies) is sometimes limited. It is challenging to 
establish legal certainty under FIs and the introduction of specific regulatory 
provisions to take this into account creates complexity. For instance, Article 9 (3)(a) 
of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 480/2014 contains detailed rules 
governing the control of FIs implemented by the European Investment Bank, 
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specifying in this case the obligation to choose an external company. This is a 
departure from the general principles of the FI management and control system and 
from the broader system of audits and checks of beneficiaries in some MS. According 
to some programme authorities interviewed, this complicates the process of 
implementing FIs, potentially delaying their implementation, and leads to an 
unjustified increase in operating costs (due to the remuneration payable to an external 
firm). 
 
Programmes with other types of intervention also face complexity:  
• OPs that include major infrastructure projects can face complex control 
and audit challenges (e.g. concerning public procurement issues). 
• OPs with small budgets or that include a high proportion of small 
operations, where the operational costs of individual control and audit procedures 
involving small amounts of funding must be weighed against the effects. 
• However, introducing simplification for some types of project in a 
differentiated way could in itself contribute to complexity. Programme 
authorities in some MS have noted that adding elements to the existing regulatory 
framework with the intention of creating ‘simpler’ procedures for certain types of 
project, leads to multiple sets of rules and so to increased complexity.52 
 
3.4.3  The Member State context 
Levels of complexity are in part dictated by domestic institutional environments in 
MS. This relates to: the allocation of management and control responsibilities across ESIF 
programmes; the strength and experience of domestic control and audit activities; and, the 
relationship between EU and domestic regulations (including the extent of gold-plating).  
• There is variation in the allocation of financial control and audit 
responsibilities across MS, depending on domestic institutional 
arrangements and the architecture of ESIF programmes. Figure 6 sets out the 
number and type of AAs in MS in 2012.  
 
                                           
52  Davies S (2015) Op. cit. 
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Figure 6: Number and type of Audit Authorities per Member State (2012) 
 
Source: ECA (2013) Op. cit. 
• Broadly speaking, these responsibilities can be centralised at different levels 
(MS, regional, programme). In terms of finding a balance between achieving 
assurance and limiting complexity, each system has its advantages and 
disadvantages. Some systems may work better in some Member States and worse in 
others. Each system has its advantages and disadvantages. 
• Centralised systems are often slow compared to de-centralised systems. 
For addressing complexity, an advantage of centralised approaches is that 
there are a limited number of controllers, and that they can be informed 
and trained to consistent standards relatively simply. 
• Decentralised systems use a higher number of audit bodies. These can 
produce quicker results with a clearer picture of issues ‘on the ground’. Nevertheless, 
it is more complex to enforce standard practices across many AAs. For this reason, 
the quality of the process can vary substantially from one controller to the next. In 
some cases, e.g. in Italy, a decentralised system with regional AAs is complemented 
by national coordination, realised by the General Inspectorate for financial relations 
with the European Union at the Ministry of Economy and Finance (IGRUE). The 
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implementation of rules, good practice experiences and common challenges are 
discussed within regular meetings involving all AAs and IGRUE representatives.  
 
• Institutional stability helps to limit complexity. Previous research on Cohesion 
policy administration indicates the importance of stability for efficient implementation, 
emphasising the need for timely reorganisation and continuity of personnel whatever 
the organisational changes.53 The risk of error and complexity in financial control and 
audit increase where institutional arrangements are in flux or staff turnover is high. 
Lack of experience and institutional memory at different levels can be particularly 
problematic for control and audit, given the considerable level of technicality of the 
tasks involved. Conversely, programme authorities have noted the benefit of strong, 
stable relations between MAs, IBs and AAs in dealing with complex challenges, 
including through informal contacts. 
 
• Responsibilities can be sub-contracted but this depends on the strength and 
experience of domestic actors in these fields. In some of the case studies 
covered in this research, outsourcing of management tasks simplifies the work of 
programme authorities and carries little risk as there is a large, developed market of 
trusted consultants. This does not apply in Member States with limited experience of 
Cohesion policy management and with smaller, less developed consultancy markets. 
Indeed, in some contexts, ESIF control and audit requirements have a capacity-
building effect. Some beneficiaries have developed substantial new systems and 
capacities to ensure transparency and regularity in their operations as a result of 
meeting EU regulations and guidance. In these contexts, programme authorities 
encourage exchange of experience among beneficiaries for this purpose of building 
capacity. 
 
• Relationship between domestic and EU regulations. A fundamental 
characteristic of the ESIF shared management system is the interaction of EU and 
domestic regulations. The complexity created by this interaction varies across Member 
States depending on the degree of alignment between EU and domestic regulatory 
frameworks, administrative cultures and traditions, previous audit experiences etc. 
To give an example of these different traditions from our case study research, the 
same territorial cooperation project can have four pages of guidance on one side of a 
national border and 40 pages on the other side. In some countries, levels of domestic 
assurance and administrative capacity mean that Commission guidance is used in a 
selective way, targeting the relevant issues and procedures. However, in countries 
where this capacity is lacking, Commission guidance is fully incorporated in detail. 
This produces a comprehensive but complex set of rules for programme authorities. 
This distinction between MS cases should not be perceived as a straightforward split 
between ‘more developed’ and ‘less developed’ examples. There are specific cases 
where complexity is the result of specific dysfunctions in administrations (e.g. tensions 
and lack of trust between institutions caused by institutional or political rivalries).  
 
• Gold plating, i.e. the introduction of additional administrative procedures and 
regulatory obligations that go beyond the ESIF requirements set out at EU level, is a 
cause of complexity in financial control and audit processes. Recent research has 
                                           
53  Wostner P (2008) ‘The Micro-efficiency of EU Cohesion policy’ European Policy Research Papers, No 64, European 
Policies Research Centre, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow. 
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found evidence of ‘gold-plating’ in the presence of additional requirements related to 
financial controls.54 It finds cases where the financial control on ESIF is more rigid 
than required by ESIF regulations, including: more rigid controls in terms of 
application of lower thresholds or stricter rules when conducting public procurement 
procedures; additional control procedures at various steps of programme 
implementation, additional criteria to be proven by beneficiaries to obtain an audit 
exemption; and stricter interpretation of eligibility criteria than required by 
regulations. However, it should be noted that in some case studies covered in this 
research, programme authorities have seen efforts to streamline procedures resisted 
by the Commission. Case study research for this study identified cases where MS 
initiatives to simplify procedures by relying on checks by domestic authorities (e.g. 
under public procurement) were opposed by the Commission: programme authorities 
were required to carry out their own checks, effectively duplicating tasks and creating 
‘gold plating’. 
 
3.4.4  Role of EU-level institutions 
Of course, EU-level institutions play a fundamental role in deciding the balance between the 
requirements for financial control and the need to limit complexity. This relates to: setting 
the regulatory framework and providing guidance; and, carrying out audits and controls (by 
European Commission and ECA).  
• Lack of a standardised approach to the regulations governing EU instruments 
under shared management (ESIF) and direct management (e.g. COSME, 
Horizon 2020) constrains the pursuit of synergies and creates complexity. 
Inconsistency in the treatment of similar projects across EU instruments creates 
practical difficulties that make it more difficult to use ESIF in a way that is 
complementary to centrally managed instruments. This includes challenges involving: 
• Public procurement. Public procurement rules are not specific to Cohesion 
policy. However, dealing with public procurement issues is a significant 
challenge, due to the interaction of domestic and Commission regulations 
and the accumulation of myriad rules. Managing Authorities have to take 
into account domestic regulations and Commission directives on public 
procurement and this creates a complex system, often with duplication and 
excessive checking of details for beneficiaries. The complexity of EU, 
national and regional rules and their frequent changes at the national and 
regional level has been cited as a cause of errors in public procurement.55 
This acts as a disincentive for beneficiaries who see the system as punitive. 
A particular challenge for ESIF is that – in particular in comparison to 
national subsidy schemes – several layers of control are at work. Thus the 
probability to detect infringements of PP rules is higher. Some smaller 
programme authorities address this complexity by using the services of 
external specialist companies, though this is not possible in all contexts and 
does not exonerate programme authorities from responsibility for possible 
                                           
54  Spatial Foresight et al. (2017) Gold-plating in the European Structural and Investment Funds Research for 
European Parliament REGI Committee. 
55  Working Group on Structural Funds (2016) Report to the Contact Committee of the heads of the Supreme Audit 
Institutions of the Member States of the European Union and the European Court of Auditors on the parallel audit 
of Analysis of (types of) errors in EU and national public procurement within the Structural Funds programmes. 
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errors. The views gathered through the case study research undertaken for 
this study indicate that errors in public procurement appear to be mainly 
the result of genuine mistakes resulting from complex rules. As a result, 
project promoters are frustrated by ex-post audits, which often arrive at a 
late stage in proceedings, when fixing mistakes is no longer possible and 
when they do not have the possibility to ask for a provisional binding ruling. 
• State aid. While programmes managed centrally by the European 
Commission are exempt from state aid procedures, funding under ESIF is 
not exempt and the situation is very complicated for beneficiaries and MAs.56 
State aid is often subject to different interpretations in different Member 
States: there is no clear, comprehensive interpretation of State aid, with 
judgements being based solely on individual applications and findings. This 
again leads to the accumulation of myriad sets of rules and guidance without 
achieving adequate legal certainty. 
• Need for clear and timely guidance. A common cause of complexity noted by 
programme authorities is the provision of EU guidance, including: 
• Proliferation of documentation. A basic problem is the accumulation 
of documents and guidance notes produced by the European Commission 
at different points in time and coming from different sources. Over time, 
a mass of ‘secondary documentation’, consisting of guidance and 
interpretation of regulations has developed (e.g. on sampling 
methodologies or audit strategies). The problem is exacerbated by the 
fact that there are often no dates in documents and so it is not clear what 
the most up to date guidance is. This accumulation is in part explained 
by a dynamic whereby errors detected in a specific programme trigger 
guidance from the EU-level that is then applied horizontally across all 
programmes, creating extra checks and also administrative burden where 
those elements are already compliant. As this guidance builds up, the 
administrative burden and complexity increases for all programme 
authorities and beneficiaries, and the scope for further error also 
increases. 
• Lack of clarity. Commission guidance is often open to various 
interpretations. It is arguable that this encourages flexibility in adapting 
EU-level requirements to programme-specific conditions. However, 
programme authorities often react to uncertainty and perceived risks by 
maximising safeguarding measures, trying to prevent their decisions 
from being challenged by other institutions in the system.  
 
• Ambiguous legal status, uncertainty. Formally, Commission guidance 
is not legally binding but in practice, MAs and IBs are concerned that 
auditors may act under a stricter interpretation of the guidelines and treat 
some of them as obligatory. For instance, making the management 
declaration and annual summary is an important new responsibility for 
the MAs but some authorities found the guidance vague: it included 
                                           
56  Committee of the Regions (2016) Simplification of ESIF from the perspective of Local and Regional Authorities - 
opinion, 119th plenary session, 10, 11 and 12 October 2016. 
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examples of best practice and some general suggestions but was not 
transparent on what the strict MA obligations are. 
 
• The need for timeliness. Commission guidelines are often published 
very late. Some important guidance, notably on the Annual Closure 
process, was not issued by the Commission until the second half of 2015.  
• Coordination and consistency in control and audit procedures. Coordination 
and consistency in audits is crucial in limiting complexity, given the different levels 
of control to which ESIF programmes and operations are subject. Table 4 sets out the 
audit of operations carried out under different ESI funds in 2015 alone. The role of 
the European Commission and ECA is important in this. Experience across MS varies 
in this respect. Some programme authorities noted the difficulties caused by multiple 
visits from auditors from MS and EU levels which can use different methodologies and 
produce different assessments. Other authorities have found the visits of different EU 
bodies to projects to be well coordinated. It is also worth noting current initiatives to 
increase the cooperation between the Commission and the ECA in developing 
consistent methodological approaches and in drawing on each other’s results in 
developing assessments, already discussed57.  
Table 4: Audit of operations by the AAs (representative sample) in 2015 
 No. OPs No. 
operations 
No. 
operations 
audited 
% audited 
operations 
% audited 
amount 
ERDF/CF 322 249 361 7 294 <3% 29% 
Average/OP  774 23 
ESF 118 832 025 4 976 <1% 15% 
Average/OP  7 051 42 
Source:  Sébert, F. (2016) ‘Audit of ESF and ERDF ‘, presentation at High Level Expert Group meeting 
29/11/2016. 
 
 
  
                                           
57  European Court of Auditors (2017) Background paper: The ECA’s modified approach to the Statement of 
Assurance audits in Cohesion, 14.12.2017. 
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4. CONTROL AND AUDIT IN THE SIMPLIFICATION 
AGENDA: WHAT IS WORKING? 
SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS 
• As with previous regulatory packages, the CPR introduced a number of measures 
intended to simplify procedures and reduce the complexity associated with financial 
control and audit. 
• In 2017, the European Commission and the European Parliament have both restated 
the need to reconsider arrangements for simplifying control and audit. 
• Cutting across this issue is the Commission’s ‘Better Regulation Agenda’, a package 
of reforms adopted in 2015 to: boost transparency in the EU decision-making process; 
improve the quality of new laws through better impact assessments of draft 
legislation; and, promote constant and consistent review of existing EU laws, so that 
EU policies achieve their objectives in the most effective and efficient way. 
• Programme authorities recognise the need for effective rules in order to avoid errors, 
fraud and the misuse of funds and welcomed the basic principles on which these 
measures are based. Nevertheless, OP authorities continue to call for greater 
simplification of OP financial management and proportionality in audit and control.  
• Recent research conducted among programme authorities in different MS for the IQ-
Net Network highlighted some key issues related to: (i) the persistent lack of legal 
certainty; (ii) the need for more proportionality and legal certainty; (iii) the need to 
clarify further the legal framework and operationalisation of SCOs; (iv) a number of 
other specific issues related to audit and control procedures, for example in relation 
to sampling methods and the timing of these activities. 
 
4.1 ESIF simplification and control 2014-20 – key measures 
Over the years, there has been increased awareness of the ‘perverse effects’ of ESIF control 
and audit, in terms of increasing the complexity of implementation and reducing the efficiency 
and effectiveness of programmes. As a result, a simplification agenda has accompanied each 
policy reform debate since 1999, with control and audit at the heart of proposals for 
simplification and streamlining of procedures.  
As with previous regulatory packages, the CPR introduced a number of measures 
intended to simplify procedures and reduce the complexity associated with financial 
control and audit.58 The Commission published a draft working paper in 2011 on simplification 
in the Cohesion policy regulations for 2014-20, which set out proposed changes.59 This was 
followed in 2012 by a Commission communication on simplification in the Multi-annual 
Financial Framework,60 and by a brochure targeted at beneficiaries and Managing 
                                           
58  For a review see Davies S (2015) Op. cit.; and, EPRC (2016) ‘The simplification of EU Cohesion policy: Problems 
and Priorities for Change’, IQ-Net Briefing, January 2016, European Policies Research Centre, University of 
Strathclyde, Glasgow. 
59  European Commission (2012) Op. cit.; European Commission (2011) Simplification in the legislative framework 
for Cohesion policy for 2014-2020, Draft Working Paper, Fiche no 9, Brussels, 18.11.2011. 
60  European Commission (2012) A Simplification Agenda for the MFF 2014-2020, Communication to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, 
Brussels, 8.2.2012, COM(2012) 42 final. 
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Authorities.61 In addition, various studies on this theme were undertaken for the European 
Commission,62 the European Parliament63 and the Committee of the Regions.64 Based on the 
shortcomings that emerged during the 2007-13 period, the 2013 CPR adopted a number of 
innovations aimed at simplifying control and audit requirements (see Table 2).  
In 2017, the European Commission and the European Parliament have both 
restated the need to reconsider arrangements for simplifying control and audit. This 
applies to the remainder of the period and the future, reviewing the operationalisation of 
shared management in order to avoid the delays that are characterising the current 
programme cycle, and render all procedures more manageable for the authorities in charge 
of the funds and programme beneficiaries.65 A High Level Group on Simplification, established 
by the Commission in July 2015,66 has formulated a number of recommendations on 
simplification in a number of areas,67 including control and audit (see Section 1.3). At the 
end of 2016, the Commission, in the framework of the mid-term review/revision of the 
multiannual financial framework (MFF) 2014-20, proposed a new Omnibus Regulation. This 
amends several regulations on the implementation of EU policies in 2014-20 (including the 
CPR applicable to Cohesion policy) and the financial rules applicable to the general budget. 
A stated goal is to pursue further simplification and flexibility for the remainder of the 
programming period (2017-20).68 In this new Omnibus Regulation, the Commission restated 
that sound financial management remains a key objective of EU financial rules. The new 
regulation seeks to strengthen the systems in place to protect the EU budget against fraud 
and financial irregularities, and contributes to reduce the administrative burden of 
programme implementation and the number of errors, in so doing also supporting a higher 
impact of EU policies on the ground.69  
Cutting across these issues is the Commission’s ‘Better Regulation Agenda’, a 
package of reforms adopted in 2015 to boost transparency in the EU decision-making 
process, improve the quality of new laws through better impact assessments of draft 
legislation, and promote constant and consistent review of existing EU laws, so that EU 
policies achieve their objectives in the most effective and efficient way. Notably, it advocates 
                                           
61  European Commission (2012) Simplifying Cohesion policy for 2014-2020, Brussels, p. 3.  
62  t33, Archidata, Berman Group, CSIL, Infyde, Laboratorium Rozwoju, METIS, and SWECO (2012) Measuring the 
impact of changing regulatory requirements to administrative cost and administrative burden of managing EU 
Structural Funds, Report to the European Commission, Brussels. 
63  For instance, see Mendez C, Bachtler J and Wishlade F (2012) Cohesion policy after 2013: A critical assessment 
of the legislative proposals, Report to the European Parliament’s DG for Internal Policies, PE 474.558, Brussels. 
64  Dhéret C, Zuleeg F and Chiorean-Sime S (2012) EU Financial Regulation: Analysis of the simplification measures 
mentioned in both the proposal for a EU Financial Regulation and the Cohesion policy legislative package, Report 
by the European Policy Centre for the Committee of the Regions, Brussels. 
65  European Commission (2016a) Op. cit.; European Parliament (2017a) Resolution of 16 February 2017 on 
investing in jobs and growth – maximising the contribution of European Structural and Investment Funds: an 
evaluation of the report under Article 16(3) of the CPR (P8_TA -PROV(2017)0053 ); European Parliament (2017b) 
Resolution of 16 February 2017 on delayed implementation of ESI Funds operational programmes – impact on 
Cohesion policy and the way forward (P8_TA-PROV(2017)0055); European Parliament (2016a) Resolution of 11 
May 2016 on acceleration of implementation of Cohesion policy (P8_TA(2016)0217); European Parliament 
(2016b), Resolution of 6 July 2016 on synergies for innovation: the European Structural and Investment Funds, 
Horizon 2020 and other European innovation funds and EU programmes (P8_TA(2016)0311); and European 
Parliament (2015) Resolution of 26 November 2015 ‘Towards simplification and performance orientation in 
Cohesion policy 2014-2020’ (P8_TA(2015)0419). 
66  ‘High Level Group of Independent Experts on Monitoring Simplification for Beneficiaries of the European 
Structural and Investment Funds’. 
67  These include e-governance, simplified cost options, easier access to EU funding for SMEs, financial instruments, 
gold-plating, and control and audit. 
68  European Commission (2016b) Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, Brussels, 14.9.2016, COM(2016) 605 final, 
2016/0282 (COD). 
69  European Commission (2016a) Op. cit., p. 3. 
Control and simplification of procedures within ESIF 
___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
53 
a ‘Fitness Check’: a comprehensive assessment of a given policy area that addresses how 
several related legislative acts contribute to the attainment of policy objectives. This process 
can identify overlaps, inconsistencies synergies and the cumulative impacts of regulation. As 
part of this, the REFIT Platform brings together the Commission, national authorities and 
other stakeholders in regular meetings to improve existing EU legislation. The aim is to keep 
the entire stock of EU legislation under review and ensure that regulatory burdens are 
minimised and that all simplification options are identified and applied.70 
4.2 Experiences in 2014-20 
Responses from programme authorities have recognised the need for effective rules in 
order to avoid errors, fraud and the misuse of funds and welcomed the basic 
principles on which these measures are based. Nevertheless, OP authorities from across 
the EU continue to call for greater simplification of OP financial management and 
proportionality in audit and control.71 Doubts have been expressed as to whether they 
will lead to genuine simplification in practice.  
Recent research conducted among programme authorities in different MS for the IQ-Net 
Network highlighted some key issues related to: (i) the persistent lack of legal certainty; (ii) 
the need for more proportionality and legal certainty; (iii) the need to clarify further the legal 
framework and operationalisation of SCOs; (iv) a number of other specific issues related to 
audit and control procedures, for example in relation to sampling methods and the timing of 
these activities (Box 1). 72 
Box 1: Experiences with simplification in 2014-20 in IQ-Net programmes 
1. Continued lack of legal certainty 
Many programme authorities continue to experience a lack of legal certainty due to unclear and 
complex rules, which was seen to imply a transfer of audit risk from the Commission to domestic 
OP authorities, potentially leading to programme interruptions and suspensions. Key issues 
include: 
Multiple EU-level legal and guidance documents – and the lack of consistency between them 
(Common Provisions Regulation, Fund regulations, Implementing Acts, Delegated Acts, 
Guidelines…), so that OP authorities have to combine and interpret the different texts; 
Delays when Managing Authorities submit queries to the Commission on specific questions 
relating to legal certainty; 
A lack of stability over time in rules (e.g. on State aid and revenue-generating projects in 
2007-13) and in the EU authorities’ interpretations of rules; 
Retroactive decisions, with EU authorities re-interpreting rules in a stricter light at a later point 
in time and applying the new interpretation to previous years; 
Insufficient Commission guidance on the application of new initiatives, which may 
therefore not be fully exploited due to concerns over legal certainty; 
A reluctance to use national eligibility rules, because of a perceived risk that the 
Commission could introduce future rules which differ from the national approach. 
                                           
70  European Commission (2015) Commission Staff Working Document – Better Regulation Guidelines. Document 
SWD(2015) 111 final. 
71  Lehuraux T (2017) ‘Gathering implementation speed: the progress of Structural Funds programmes’, IQ-Net 
Review Paper 40(1), European Policies Research Centre, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow. 
72  See Davies S (2015) Op. cit. for a detailed assessment of these issues. 
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Due to concerns over legal certainty and clarity in the context of financial control and audit, the 
regulations are now accompanied by a proliferation of delegated acts, implementing acts, 
and Commission guidance notes. 
2. Coordination and proportionality  
The layers of checks i.e. of the beneficiary is accountable to the intermediate body, which is 
accountable to the MA, which is accountable to the audit authority and the Commission, while the 
audit authority is accountable to the Commission and the European Court of Auditors, and the 
Commission is accountable to the European Parliament and European Court of Auditors; 
moreover, these EU layers of checks operate alongside parallel domestic layers of checks; 
Commission’s tendency to micro-manage implementation across OPs; 
Simplification has consisted of adding elements to the existing framework (with ‘simpler’ 
procedures applying only to certain types of project) – which leads to multiple sets of rules and 
so to increased complexity. For example, although the idea of Simplified Cost Options may be 
attractive to programme authorities it can only be applied in the case of grants and repayable 
assistance (Article 67(1) CPR) and not where an operation or a project forming part of an operation 
is implemented exclusively through public procurement (see Article 67(4) CPR and section 1.6.2, 
page 11). SCOs are also more viable where reliable data on financial and quantitative 
implementation of operations are available or where the operations belong to a standard 
framework. As a result, programme authorities find that the rules for implementation must be set 
twice: first, for the “full” alternative, second, for the simplified option.  
A perception that there has been a transfer of audit risk from the Commission to 
national/regional AAs and MAs and beneficiaries, generating uncertainty and caution about 
future audit consequences. 
3. Simplified cost options  
Many programme authorities have adopted simplified cost options, which are seen as helpful, 
although preparatory work is onerous. The benefits recognised by OP authorities include: (i) 
reducing the workload for the beneficiary (particularly during the payment phase); (ii) speeding 
up payment processing and reducing the need for clarifications, and (iii) reducing the error rate.  
Nevertheless, some programme authorities have experienced a series of difficulties with 
SCOs: 
Legal uncertainty. For some OP authorities, the Commission has not provided enough guidance 
and has been slow to respond to queries. There is also a lack of clarity about which aspects require 
Commission approval. As a result, some OPs have decided not to use (some) SCO (e.g. unit 
costs), adopted methods in other EU funding streams (e.g. Horizon 2020 and LIFE), notably flat-
rates, or cooperated with domestic authorities on methods and data sources.  
Administrative burden. The work involved in establishing methodologies and data sources for 
calculating SCO is considerable and time-consuming (e.g. related to the use of unit costs, 
definition of personnel costs, state aid and public procurement issues etc.) as was the 
communication process with the Commission. Some MS have set up units to work with OP 
authorities to develop methods and implement SCO, developed national guidance and eligibility 
rules for MAs; or brought in external expertise in developing methods and data sources. It can be 
anticipated that the administrative burden involved will decline in the future if similar rules are 
applied. Nevertheless, the amount of work involved has hindered the broader use of SCO in some 
cases.  
Treatment of SCO in audit. There is concern that the use of SCO can create audit problems. 
Audit of operations supported under SCO in 2007-13 raised subsequent issues (e.g. in relation to 
procurement, project eligibility period, VAT, flat rate staff costs etc.).  
4. Other specific issues 
Document retention periods have been reduced to assist beneficiaries, but are now more 
complex, with dates varying by Fund and size of project, so that the MA now has to work out 
document retention dates case by case and communicate these dates to beneficiaries individually. 
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This approach is seen to create an additional administrative burden, as well as an increased risk 
of error (also because many beneficiaries receive both ERDF and ESF funding, where document 
retention periods differ); 
The mandatory annual closure of operations in the annual clearance of accounts is seen to 
generate a high administrative burden and to lead to a risk of artificial closures that are not linked 
to actual finished project or programme activities. 
Risk-based methods of sampling for controls. This change was seen as beneficial, at least in 
principle, although there were concerns in practice and calls for better and more consistent 
sampling. Although individual beneficiaries (e.g. with ‘less risky’ projects) may be audited less, 
risk-based sampling does not reduce the burden for OP authorities e.g. because the domestic 
audit authority will still have to audit the same number of projects. Smaller or less risky projects 
may not benefit from this change in practice because, in order to sample (e.g. expense) 
documents, there needs to be a larger pool from which the sample can be drawn and so all 
beneficiaries will still need to submit expense documentation. 
Smaller projects audited only once before closure. While this change is seen as helpful, 
some projects still face multiple audits.  
Scope to reduce controls and audit intensity. IQ-Net interviewees did not believe that 
changes in 2014-20 allowed much scope to reduce controls and audit intensity in practice. A 
particular concern was the disproportionate burden on smaller OPs, which have to fulfil the same 
requirements as large OPs but with less funding.  
5. MS initiatives in 2014-20 to address complexity 
In addition to simplification measures introduced at EU level, Member States and regional 
authorities have also taken the initiative to find ways of simplifying Cohesion policy 
implementation. Key measures involve efforts to: 
Revise domestic legal frameworks to reduce overlap with EU rules. One reason for the 
administrative burden facing OP authorities and beneficiaries is the need to meet both EU and 
national/regional legal requirements. This has prompted some MS to simplify domestic 
frameworks and/or to harmonise these with EU regulations. Nordrhein-Westfalen has introduced 
a Land ERDF Framework Regulation in 2014-20 which effectively transposes EU legal requirements 
into domestic law, so that projects co-funded by the ERDF must only meet these rules (e.g. in 
relation to monitoring and control), and not the ‘normal’ domestic legal requirements. This change 
also facilitates the use of simplified cost options, which are administratively difficult under 
domestic law. In Portugal, the number of national regulations has been reduced from c.100 in 
2007-13 to six in 2014-20 (one national regulation for all ESIF, one regulation for the ESF, and 
one regulation for each of the four themes of the Partnership Agreement). 
Reduce the numbers of OP authorities. Some MS have taken steps to reduce the number of 
entities involved in management and implementation, often seen to have been a challenging 
process or to have required high-level political decisions. Reductions sometimes focus only on the 
number of intermediate implementing bodies (e.g. in the Czech Republic and Scotland), or also 
on the number of MAs and programmes (e.g. in Austria, Finland and England). 
Reduce complexity for beneficiaries. Some MS have taken steps to ease the complexity faced 
by beneficiaries as a result of financial control and audit. An important question in this context is 
whether simplification for beneficiaries inevitably creates more complexity for programme 
authorities as they seek to ‘hide the wiring’ and present a simple offer for potential applicants. 
Initiatives include: simplifying eligibility rules and project application forms (e.g. Wales, 
Denmark); harmonised information points and increased support for applicants; and, simpler and 
clearer procedures, including fewer interventions (e.g. streamlining of competitive calls in 
Nordrhein-Westfalen, use of a ‘strategic intervention’ approach and ‘lead partners’ in Scotland). 
Source: Davies, S. (2015) Op. cit.  
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5. CONTROL AND SIMPLIFICATION IN THE POST-2020 
DEBATE 
SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS 
• The need for simplification in the management and control of ESIF is now a central 
topic in the debate on reforming the policy after 2020. This is reflected in a range of 
EU initiatives, including European Parliament resolutions73 and studies.74 
• Calls to simplify the rules that govern the EU budget have also been made by the 
European Court of Auditors, while underlining at the same time the utmost importance 
of undertaking careful impact assessments of existing and prospective measures, in 
order to appreciate the impact and implications of any forthcoming reform. 
• In July 2017 the HLG on Simplification made 12 recommendations on controls and 
audits for post-2020, which were part of a wider set of conclusions that included 
recommendations also on the streamlining of the shared management system, of 
legislation and guidelines, and of the rules across different funds. 
• The key underlying theme is the need to reduce the costs of administering the funds 
while retaining the positive trend in the reduction of error rates. 
• An important question is whether and how a differentiated approach could be designed 
that moves away from the one-size-fits-all model of shared management and which 
recognises that different models may be appropriate for different contexts. 
• A further question relates to the extent to which harmonisation of rules across ESIF, 
and a move toward a single set of rules for shared management funds, can support 
simplification.   
 
The need for simplification in the management and control of ESIF is now a central 
topic in the debate on reforming the policy after 2020. The Seventh report on 
economic, social and territorial cohesion noted that the policy has become increasingly 
complex to manage, calling for a “radical approach to simplifying implementation” is 
needed.75 The complexity of administration is an ongoing challenge, particularly in the area 
of audit and control, and there have been a plethora of events organised on this theme and 
documents published. A range of studies and statements, including from the Commission, 
the European Council, the European Parliament, the Committee of the Regions, as well as 
expert groups, academics and interest groups have reviewed options for a more fundamental 
and systemic simplification, involving a rethink of budgetary discharge requirements and 
responsibilities.76 Calls to simplify the rules that govern the EU budget have also been made 
                                           
73  European Parliament (2015) Resolution of 26 November 2015 ‘Towards simplification and performance 
orientation in Cohesion policy 2014-2020’ (P8_TA(2015)0419). 
74  Bachtler J and Polverari L (2017) Building Blocks for a Future Cohesion policy – First Reflections, Report to the 
European Parliament, Directorate General for Internal Policies, Policy Department B: Structural and Cohesion 
Policies. 
75  European Commission (2017) My Region, My Europe, Our Future, Seventh report on economic, social and 
territorial cohesion, Brussels, September 2017. 
76  See, for instance Creţu C (2016) Speech of Commissioner Corina Creţu at the European Union Cohesion policy 
Conference, Slovak Presidency of the EU, 16.09.2016, Bratislava; EPRS (2017) ‘Challenges for EU Cohesion 
policy Issues in the forthcoming post-2020 reform’, EPRS Briefing February 2017; High Level Group on 
Simplification (HLG) (2017) Final conclusions and recommendations of the High Level Group on Simplification 
for post 2020, and key recommendations of the High Level Group of Simplification, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/information/publications/reports/2017/esif-simplification-hlg-proposal-
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by the European Court of Auditors,77 while underlining at the same time the utmost 
importance of undertaking careful impact assessments of existing and prospective 
measures, in order to appreciate the impact and implications of any forthcoming reforms. 
In fact, while the simplification of ESIF has been on the agenda since at least the mid-2000s, 
concerns about complexity remain,78 and indeed the actors involved in the delivery of 
programmes perceive the administrative burden as having increased, rather than reduced, 
over time. Indeed, while the 2013 regulations did introduce some simplification measures, 
these were counterbalanced by new, sometimes complex requirements, such as the need to 
comply with ex ante conditionalities and the new performance framework. Although the aims 
of these initiatives to strengthen ESIF performance are important, their efficacy is still open 
to debate and they have made the overall burden on programme authorities more 
pronounced  
In July 2017 the HLG on Simplification made 12 recommendations on controls and audits for 
post-2020 (see Table 5), which were part of a wider set of conclusions that included 
recommendations also on the streamlining of the shared management system, of legislation 
and guidelines, and of the rules across different funds.  
  
                                           
for-policymakers-for-post-2020; Committee of the Regions (2016) Simplification of the implementation of 
Cohesion policy. Final Report, April 2016. 
77  European Court of Auditors (2017) Opinion No. 1/2017 concerning the proposal for a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union and amending 
Council Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002, Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 
1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1305/2013, (EU) No 1306/2013, (EU) No 1307/2013, (EU) No 
1308/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014 and (EU) No 
652/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Decision No 541/2014/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council Revision of the ‘Financial Regulation’ — Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on the financial rules applicable to the general 
budget of the Union and repealing Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 (OJ L 298, 26.10.2012, p. 
1), OJEU C 91/1, 23.3.2017, https://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/OP17_01/OP17_01_EN.pdf.  
78  Davies S (2015) ‘Is simplification simply a fiction?’ IQ-Net Thematic Paper 37(2), European Policies Research 
Centre, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow; EPRC (2016) ‘The Simplification of EU Cohesion policy: Problems and 
Priorities for Change’, IQ-Net Briefing, January 2016, European Policies Research Centre, University of 
Strathclyde, Glasgow; Bachtler J and Polverari L (2017) Building Blocks for a Future Cohesion policy – First 
Reflections, Report to the European Parliament, Directorate General for Internal Policies, Policy Department B: 
Structural and Cohesion Policies. 
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Table 4:  HLG recommendations for control and audit post-2020 
Fewer rules 
Where there is evidence that practical implementation of specific rules is difficult, 
for example, in the context of net revenue-generating projects, financial 
instruments, or eligible costs, they should be replaced by off-the-shelf solutions, 
such as flat rates, unit costs or lump sums.  
Less 
micromanagement 
and more reliance on 
national rules 
The system should be very flexible to be able to accommodate existing national 
checks rather than trying to define ‘one-size-fits-all’ rules. It should prioritise 
solutions which are embedded in national rules, rather than creating ESIF-specific 
checks parallel with or in addition to national systems. 
EU auditors should 
refrain from directly 
controlling individual 
projects 
A model should be considered whereby the Commission focuses on system audits 
while control of expenditure remains the sole responsibility of the Member States, 
in line with the principles of subsidiarity and shared management. 
Avoiding parallel 
control structures 
When it is proven that national rules (not just restricted to EU funds) function 
properly, there is no need to require a re-check by the authorities responsible for 
ESIF (e.g. in the context of public procurement, environmental acquis and state 
aid).  
Scope of audit 
proportional to risk 
through ‘smart 
differentiation’ 
Either more reliance is put on national systems, or a genuine reduction of audit 
obligations should be based on ex-ante validation (designation, accreditation or 
system audit, but still founded on common and shared criteria to ensure equal 
treatment). 
Increase legal 
certainty 
Optional early system audit to confirm the functioning of the systems, which would 
not only verify the existence of procedures, but could include a ‘pilot phase’ to test 
their implementation. 
Focus on preventive 
measures 
Involvement of auditors before approval of guidelines, better and regular 
communication between the Commission, audit and MAs to discuss recurring issues 
and disagreements, preparing template documents (e.g. for public procurement) 
for use in projects. 
Shift towards risk-
based auditing 
Reducing the audit burden on beneficiaries, public authorities with proven capacity 
(or another effectiveness measure), and a shift towards performance-based 
auditing where the project result is of key importance in the audit trail and 
implementation is of secondary importance. 
Single audit+ 
Raising the thresholds under which any project could be audited only once. ‘Higher-
level’ audits should be related to re-performance, with the beneficiary not affected 
by any additional future findings. The requirements connected to each individual 
payment, or required annually, should be replaced by risk-based verifications which 
take place just once in the project’s lifetime and are limited in scope. 
A faster and more 
transparent conflict-
resolution mechanism 
The necessary procedure to reach the conclusions often takes too long. Commission 
should consider setting up a functionally independent appeal committee, taking into 
account experience from the EAFRD and possibly limiting its use to issues with 
significant financial impact. 
More differentiated 
approach to errors 
and fraud 
A new definition is needed which clearly distinguishes between fraud and errors, as 
well as making a distinction between the gravity of errors. The justification for the 
2% materiality threshold should also be reconsidered, particularly for innovative, 
small and cross-border projects, or which are implemented by small organisations. 
Preventing gold-
plating 
The application of all procedures which are not described either in the regulation or 
guidelines should not be considered automatically as a breach of the rules and 
should be assessed on a case-by-case basis. 
Source: HLG (2017) Final conclusions and recommendations of the High Level Group on Simplification for post 
2020, http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/information/publications/reports/2017/esif-simplification-
hlg-proposal-for-policymakers-for-post-2020  
 
All of these statements and studies highlight general questions and some specific issues to 
be considered in balancing the objectives of simplification and sound financial management 
post-2020. The key underlying theme across all these different topics is the need to reduce 
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the costs of administering the funds while retaining the positive trend in the 
reduction of error rates. 
A key question is whether and how a differentiated approach could be designed that 
moves away from the one-size-fits-all model of shared management and which recognises 
that different models may be appropriate for different contexts. In the area of financial 
management, audit and control, there are arguments for a fundamental review of the way 
Cohesion policy operates and the need to recognise differences in institutional and 
administrative structures and capacities across MS. This could involve significantly fewer 
controls where administrations can prove that they are reliable and strong audit authorities 
are in place, potentially relying only on national rules in these cases (as under the ‘single 
audit approach’). A fundamental issue is which criteria should be used to justify the use of 
devolved management in some MS. Current research is exploring the possibilities of 
differentiation for post-2020 Cohesion policy, covering a range of options (scale of funding 
involved, quality of government etc.).79 An alternative to the possibility of differentiated 
approaches would be pushing MSs to implement fewer, larger programmes, as a way to 
streamline administration and costs.  
Another issue concerns the extent to which harmonisation of rules across ESIF can 
increase simplification. Here, the debate concerns the move toward a single set of rules 
for shared management funds. It should be recognised that introducing differentiation and 
harmonisation into the management of Cohesion policy will not be easy and might well cause 
unintended consequences. In this respect, it is vital that there is certainty over the status, 
interpretation and application of Commission guidance, and whether it should be treated as 
advice, as ‘soft law’, as ‘best practice’ or as a form of regulation. A challenge in this approach 
would be to continue to accommodate the needs of different types of beneficiaries and 
projects, and of ETC programmes.80  
Specific issues in the debate include:81  
• The role of compliance and performance audits. The use of performance audit 
as a means of producing insights on the efficiency and effectiveness of programmes 
and develop recommendations for simplification has been noted in the literature.82 A 
key issue is how these benefits can be realised, in tandem with a continued focus on 
compliance that provide crucial assurance to MA and EU authorities.83  
• Simplifying (or indeed eliminating) the designation procedure (Art. 124 
CPR). The process of designating Managing Authorities and Certifying Authorities has 
been particularly complex, long and painful for programme authorities84 and it has 
had an impact on the timetable of programme launch. At the time of writing, after 
almost four full years from the start of the programme period, there are still MAs that 
have not yet been formally designated. Options being debated include: removing the 
whole procedure in future, introducing conditional/partial designation, merging 
                                           
79  Bachtler J and Mendez C (2016) Op. cit. 
80  HLG (2017) Op. cit. 
81  Committee of the Regions (2016) Simplification of the implementation of Cohesion policy Workshops on 27 
January and 10 March 2016, Final Report. 
82  T'Joen L (2016) ‘Performance auditing: Current methods and future prospects’, Journal European Court of 
Auditors, No. 9 September 2016. 
83  Ibid. 
84  Davies S (2016) Op. cit. 
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functions between the independent audit body and audit authority; and, introducing 
shortened designation procedure in case of satisfactory previous audit results. 
• Recognising the proportionality principle in the functions of the Audit 
Authority (Art. 127 CPR) e.g. through risk-based methods of sampling for controls; 
smaller projects audited only once before closure; scope to reduce controls & audit 
intensity. 
• Simplifying audit of Financial Instruments (FIs), though how to achieve this is 
still open to question. Multi-level audits and controls of FIs have been particularly 
complex and burdensome for programme authorities. 
• Increasing the materiality level of errors (e.g. from to 2%, as under Art. 28(11) 
of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 480/2014, to 5%) in order to reflect the 
balance between the administrative costs incurred in efforts to reduce the level of 
errors and the savings gained from improved financial control. 
• Simplifying statistical sampling. Audit work has become more demanding, notably 
through the requirement that AAs submit opinions based on a statistically 
representative (and thus larger) sample of checks. More flexibility for random 
statistical sampling could be introduced in case of operations covering small size 
populations. 
• Standardising and simplifying national legal verifications (common public 
procurement checklists, risk assessments, etc.). 
• Extending ‘off the shelf’ simplified cost options (Art. 67 CPR). The Commission 
could seek to establish more ‘off the shelf’ simplified cost options through delegated 
regulations in order to decrease the administrative burden and to help increase legal 
certainty for the MAs. 
Figure 7 below, provides a summary of the views of the actors interviewed from the MAs and 
AAs of the seven programmes selected for our investigation on the main simplification 
proposals currently being discussed, and in some cases introduced for 2014-2020, in relation 
to control and audit functions, namely: 
• The increased proportionality of control and audit activities, i.e. whether there 
is real scope to reduce control and audit intensity based on EU contribution, risk-based 
methods of sampling for controls, auditing of smaller projects only once before closure 
and similar; 
• Rationalisation of tasks and responsibilities assigned to different authorities, 
i.e. the scope to assign MAs the responsibility of carrying out proportionate and 
effective antifraud measures, based on risk assessment, and the possibility for 
programmes with financial allocations less than EUR 250 million to subsume the AA 
within the same authority that also acts as MA; 
• The simplified designation of audit and control systems, i.e. the national 
designation instead of Commission approval of management and control systems 
(review by the Commission only in specific cases); 
• A shift from multiple layers of controls to cross reliance on audit, assessment 
or authorisation, and the harmonisation of reporting requirements, including 
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increased reliance on one single audit, assessment or authorisation, when conditions 
are met to be taken into account in the EU system; the increased reliance on 
implementing partners’ own procedures once these have been positively assessed 
(i.e. EIB, IMF, promotional banks, agencies, NGOs etc.); and the signature of financial 
framework agreements with long term partners to improve harmonisation of audit, 
reporting etc.; 
• Easing audit burden at closure, for example via annual declarations of assurance; 
• The introduction of harmonised rules across funds, as anticipated in Title VIII 
of the Omnibus regulation, allowing easier combination of multiple funds in a single 
programme; 
• The introduction of simplified rules on specific issues, such as flat rates for 
revenue generating projects or simplified audit arrangements for Financial 
Instruments; and, 
• The simplification of rules for beneficiaries in relation to grants, for example 
the removal of non-cumulative award check for low-value grants and of the non-profit 
principle; simpler rules for the valuation of the ‘contribution in kind’, the ability to 
provide grant awards without calls for proposal under specific conditions, and the 
provision of simplified forms of grants (again, as anticipated by the Omnibus 
regulation proposal, Title VIII). 
Interviewees were asked to rate the perceived utility of each measure on a scale 1 (not 
useful) to 5 (extremely useful), and to discuss the reasons for their assessments.  
Figure 7:  Overall assessment of utility of different simplification measures 
 
Source:  Case study research. 
As Figure 7 shows, the measure considered as, prospectively, the most useful is the 
harmonisation of rules across funds. While efforts in this direction have already been 
introduced in the 2013 regulations, according to the interviewees consulted for this study 
there are still areas of significant inconsistencies across funds, for instance different 
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approaches to using past ‘track records’ of beneficiaries, identifying those that have had 
repeated problems with errors in the past. There is a perceived need for alignment of the 
regulatory requirements of different EU policies. Of particular concern is the way that 
requirements in different EU legislation are currently combined with ESIF rules, sometimes 
without clear thematic coherence, which complicates or inhibits smooth, effective realization 
of ESIF in certain fields. For ETC programmes involving third countries, this harmonisation 
effort should also apply to IPA.  
More streamlined accounting, simplified rules for beneficiaries on grants (where 
applicable) and more proportionality in audit and control were also judged as very 
desirable measures. In some cases, interviewees recognised that steps in the right 
direction have already been taken (e.g. in relation to the harmonisation of rules across funds 
and the use of SCOs) and need to be pushed further.  
Perspectives change when the same questions are examined from the point of view 
of MAs and that of AAs (see Figures 8 and 9). AAs are consistently more sceptical about 
aspects involving a shift to performance/risk-based controls and the introduction of 
proportionality in control and audits. Auditors at EU and national levels expressed doubts 
about the feasibility and utility of the approach, stressing:  
(i) the risks entailed by a shift to performance audit, i.e. that rules will not be 
strictly adhered to, including in relation to public procurement or State aids, and 
that error and irregularities might increase; 
(ii) the positive role that compliance audits have in enhancing the legality and 
regularity aspects of programme delivery, and the learning or capacity-building 
function that compliance audits have in raising awareness among MAs and 
beneficiaries of the need to comply with rules (e.g. on State aids, public 
procurement);  
(iii) the scope of the change that would be involved by a shift to performance oriented 
audit, as a move to a performance audit system would mean a fundamental 
change to the current model, i.e. a shift in paradigm that would require 
altogether different professional profiles and/or extensive (re)training efforts and 
gearing-up times; 
(iv) the importance of statistical representativeness in sampling methods for 
compliance audits. There has been debate on replacing statistical 
representativeness with random or risk-based representativeness in order to ease 
the administrative burden of audits. However, auditors emphasis that statistical 
representativeness is essential to guarantee adequate audit coverage (and thus 
confidence in the auditing work); 
(v) the difficulty to link control and audit activities to the size of projects since 
‘relative size’ differs by type of projects and fields of interventions; 
(vi) that while the single audit approach is seen as very valuable, a necessary 
precondition is the creation of standard methods to be utilised by all 
involved, and of a basis of trust across different institutions and types of actors. 
Figure 8: MA case studies - views on simplification options 
Control and simplification of procedures within ESIF 
___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
63 
Source:  Case study research. 
 
 
Figure 9: AA case studies - views on simplification options 
 
Source:  Case study research. 
Specific issues can be raised in relation to FIs and ETC programmes. With regards to 
the former, interviewees tended to agree with previous research findings that FIs increase 
the complexity of programme implementation, require specialist skills and present specific 
challenges with regards to control and audit.85 FIs make up a significant part of the 
complexity of audit work and place substantial demands on the capacity and competences of 
                                           
85  Bachtler J, Mendez C and Polverari L (2016) ‘Ideas and Options for Cohesion policy Post-2020’, IQ-Net Thematic 
Paper 38(2), May 2016, European Policies Research Centre, University of Strathclyde, p. 56. 
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AA staff: they have to possess knowledge and skills in dealing with complex FI-related issues. 
The data transmitted by national authorities to the Commission on FIs funded by the ERDF 
and ESF are in some cases incomplete and inaccurate, and can present errors, for example 
in relation to funding ineligible projects or costs.86  
ETC programmes present specific challenges, related to the types of projects funded 
(mostly immaterial) and the different institutional settings involved that can condition 
implementation, especially when the programmes involve non-EU countries (for example in 
the area of State aids where national legislations in countries outside the EU are not aligned 
with the EU framework).  
  
                                           
86  European Court of Auditors (2016) Annual Report of the Court of Auditors on the implementation of the budget 
concerning the financial year 2015, together with the institutions’ replies, OJEU 2016/C 275/01. 
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6.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
6.1 Identifying complexity 
• The current system has been working effectively in terms of its ability to 
drive errors and irregularities down. The problem is essentially one of the 
costs incurred in the process of financial control and audit versus the benefits 
this produces. While the costs of the current control and audit system are 
problematic, there is still a need for checks to be carried out to ensure that all 
applicable rules are respected (including horizontal rules such as those on state aid 
and public procurement rules).  
 
• At the present moment, significant simplification has yet to be realised. A 
significant portion of the complexity of administering (and checking) ESIF relates to 
rules that are outside the sphere of Cohesion policy (e.g. relating to state aid and 
public procurement).  
 
• An important challenge is represented by inconsistent and unstable rules 
between different EU instruments. The lack of stability and consistency in 
regulatory frameworks generates significant complexity. There is unfair competition 
between ESIF and other EU instruments, due to the different levels of complexity in 
instruments under shared and direct management (e.g. complexity involved in 
implementing infrastructure projects under ERDF is much greater than under the 
Connecting Europe Facility, and the use of Financial Instruments under ESIF is more 
complex compared to EFSI).  
 
There are also specific issues within ESIF related to control, audit and the need for 
assurance.  
• Management verifications, particularly administrative verifications, create 
significant complexity for MAs and beneficiaries. Providing assurance is 
challenging with complex regulations (e.g. public procurement, state aid), unclear 
guidance, and severe sanctions possible on the level of projects (net corrections for 
beneficiary) and on the level of programmes (allowed materiality only 2%). The 
cascade of controls results in legal uncertainty for beneficiaries.  
• The designation process is a new task for programme authorities. While it 
was intended to simplify the procedures behind programme launch, it has 
created complexity. MAs see the importance of the process in strengthening 
assurance but it has been onerous to carry out. 
6.2 Assessment of key simplification measures 
• Designation. One aim of the designation process was to give increased scope for 
simplification with MS given the option to carry out the process without direct 
Commission review. However, many MS opted to have a ‘heavier’ approach to 
designation due to concerns that future audits and controls would identify errors.  
• Annual reporting has benefits and drawbacks in terms of financial control 
and simplification. The fact that regulatory provisions for 2014-20 require that 
Member State’s reporting on financial corrections is now integrated into the annual 
assurance package and examined by the respective audit authorities significantly 
strengthens the Commission’s position on protecting the EU budget from irregular 
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expenditure in particular through net financial corrections. There are also advantages 
to ‘annual closure’ from the perspective of simplification and increased assurance. 
Potentially, it reduces the burdens associated with a long retention period of 
documents for individual beneficiaries and the risks for errors associated with the loss 
of the audit trail. This approach should also reduce the administrative burden and 
complexity faced by programme authorities and beneficiaries during closure processes 
at the end of programme periods. However, this ‘rolling closure’ process presents 
some challenges for programme authorities. The MA the CA and the AA need to work 
jointly to agreed deadlines to clear accounts. Also annual clearance of accounts 
creates significant workload at the end of each year. Document retention periods have 
been reduced to assist beneficiaries, but are now more complex, with dates varying 
by Fund and size of project. This approach is seen to create an additional 
administrative burden, as well as an increased risk of error (also because many 
beneficiaries receive both ERDF and ESF funding, where document retention periods 
differ). 
• Risk-based methods of sampling for controls. MAs tend to see this change as 
beneficial, at least in principle, although there are concerns in practice and calls for 
better and more consistent sampling. AAs underline the importance of retaining 
statistical sampling to maintain the necessary level of trust on the audits realised.  
 
• The ‘Single Audit’ model is seen by programme authorities to have potential 
in terms of simplification. However, it is still being rolled out and implementation 
is challenging and relies on the capacity of programme authorities and beneficiaries, 
including the quality of IT systems. There is a need for more clarity on how and when 
an auditor can rely on existing findings. 
• Simplified cost options are welcome but need to be further developed. The 
use of SCOs has resulted in genuine simplification in some cases by making 
management verifications less cumbersome. Audit Authorities can build on this and 
audit less, error rates become lower and the Commission sees more programmes and 
operations as low risk and visits less. However, take up of this option is still uneven. 
Some MS and programme authorities do not have the capacity to develop 
methodologies for the use of these SCOs. There are ‘off the shelf’ options available 
from the Commission, but the fear persists in MS and programmes that they will be 
open to controls, audit and corrections in the future unless they use the full, 
mainstream approaches. 
• ‘Once only’ audit for small operations. Is useful in principle but a potential risk is, 
for example, that the threshold for “smaller project” be set so high that most projects 
do not qualify. Project size also varies across types of project and programme; there 
may need therefore to be different thresholds for different types of ‘small’ projects. 
Thus, while further tailoring of project audits should be considered, this may more 
usefully be linked to using a risk-based approach related to the nature of the 
beneficiary or involving a lighter approach for applicants with a proven track record 
with ESIF-funded projects, rather than simply project size. 
 
 
Control and simplification of procedures within ESIF 
___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
67 
6.3  Recommendations for post-2020 
 
The research highlights a number of general principles and practical recommendations that 
should be borne in mind by stakeholders from EU and MS levels involved in designing future 
reforms with a view of reducing complexity and improving ESIF performance, while 
continuing to drive errors and irregularities down. It should be noted that striking a balance 
between these, partly conflicting, principles is challenging. In deciding the emphasis to be 
placed on different principles, clear choices have to be made on the ultimate goals of 
simplification and who should be the main target of such efforts (e.g. beneficiaries, 
programme authorities).  
General principles 
• Harmonisation. Genuine simplification must begin with greater harmonisation of 
rules across Commission services, funds and instruments. The complexity of audits 
and control is intrinsically linked to the complexity and clarity of the rules that the 
actors in charge of controls and audits check. Any simplification has to start with this, 
with renewed efforts for greater harmonisation of rules. This highlights the role of EU 
initiatives in this field, including the Better Regulation AGENDA and the REFIT 
Platform.  
 
• Stability. More stability from one programme period to the next and better 
predictability for programme authorities and beneficiaries would simplify 
implementation, cut the times and costs of adaptation, and reduce the risk of errors 
and irregularities. For instance, a recent Commission study on the take-up and 
effectiveness of financial instruments called for greater regulatory stability given the 
complexity of the rules and their revision on a seven-year cycle.87 
 
• Brevity. There should be single texts, made available to programme authorities in a 
timely manner, rather than a proliferation of rules and interpretations. This would 
enable better coordination between different actors and the timely identification of 
administrative capacity gaps to realise necessary capacity building activities. 
 
• Trust and capacity building. There are numerous examples where the Commission 
has tried to introduce simplification by increasing the scope for flexibility and 
proportionality in control and audit fields (e.g. the Single Audit model, SCOs, the 
option of ‘lighter’ designation procedures). However, limited take up of these options 
across MS and programmes can be explained by lack of trust and/or capacity. 
Capacity-building and trust-building at beneficiary level will take some resources from 
the Commission and programme authorities but this can be seen as a one off 
investment that will create bottom up benefits for all levels in the longer term. An 
example of this is the use of SCOs where there are examples of Commission efforts 
to build trust has seen significant take up and an accompanying decrease in error 
rates. 
 
• Flexibility and differentiation. Different beneficiaries have different capacities, 
different operations involve various processes and programmes vary in terms of their 
budget, thematic scope and implementation arrangements. Regulations and guidance 
should not respond to this through micromanagement and the accumulation of myriad 
requirements based on specific experiences and problems. Rather, there should be 
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flexibility to adapt regulations and guidance to suit different contexts. However, 
objective criteria on which to build this flexibility must be found. The key challenge is 
how to set objective criteria on which differentiation can be based, including on 
financial management issues. For instance, the error rate or level of irregularities 
would in theory be a strong criterion: fewer irregularities would indicate stronger 
capacity and less need for control. However, it is important to note some challenges 
in using this as a simple criterion. The level of irregularities can be conditioned by the 
level of resources available for Cohesion policy audit and the capacity of AAs: a high 
level of errors may reflect good detection. Moreover, different types of interventions 
incur varied levels of risk (e.g. programmes containing a high share of innovative 
projects may be associated with more errors).88   
 
• Appraisal, to avoid unintended consequences. A number of valuable simplifications 
(e.g. the use of SCOs) have already been introduced but their benefits has been 
undermined by new requirements which generated further complexity. To avoid this, 
it is paramount that the impact on administrative cost and burden of any reform 
proposal is carefully appraised and that this impact is compared with the benefits 
associated with retaining the current rules and systems.  
 
• Timing is an issue when developing proposals and ideas. Commission authorities, 
including audit authorities, are being asked to make proposals for the future over the 
next few months. However, due to delays in programme implementation, they have 
little evidence to assess what is and is not working. Thus, EU and national authorities 
should take a longer-term view in appraising what works and what doesn’t. In the 
past, sometimes rules were discontinued in one programming period only to be 
reintroduced in the next, without serious reflection about the reasons behind their 
discontinuation (e.g. multi-fund programmes, performance reserve).  
 
• Role of the Commission. Continued pursuit of simplification initiatives, reviewing 
and revising current regulations, including the HLG on Simplification, ‘Better 
Regulation Agenda’ and the REFIT Platform and support of capacity-building initiatives 
in MS to strengthen simplification (e.g. in the take up of SCOs),  removing 
unnecessary requirements and not rewriting new rules as beneficiaries learnt them 
over the years.  
 
• Role of ECA. The ECA is crucial in balancing the need for legality and regularity of 
expenditure with the need for simplification. Current initiatives to strengthen cross 
reliance with the Commission and MS (in terms of the results of controls, 
methodological approaches etc.) should be further developed. Nevertheless, the 
autonomy of the ECA remains paramount; the ECA is not part of the ESIF system and 
their opinion is independent.  
 
• Role of the Member States. It is important that MS play an active part in reducing 
complexity, for instance through reviewing domestic rules that can have an impact on 
complexity through ‘gold-plating’ (e.g. public procurement rules that are more 
restrictive than EU ones), or through simplification of programme management and 
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implementation systems (for example by limiting the multiplication of bodies which is 
generated by a high number of OPs). 
 
• The performance orientation. The spread of performance audit and their use for 
financial decisions could be further pursued at EU and MS levels. However, this should 
not come at the detriment of lowering the historical error rate. The ECA could become 
more involved with MS authorities by presenting performance audit reports before 
national parliaments more regularly. It could also seek closer cooperation with 
national audit institutions to harmonize audit approaches, for instance through 
‘coordinated’ audits (e.g. JASPERS performance audit was coordinated between ECA 
and the Polish Supreme Audit Authority) or ‘joint’ performance audits where ECA 
auditors take part in MS performance audits of nationally-funded measures while MS 
auditors take part in ECA performance audits of similar EU co-funded projects. These 
proposals need to be considered bearing in mind the remit for the ECA to act 
efficiently: past experiences of coordination and collaboration with national auditors 
have proven in some cases very resource-intensive. Further, it should be noted that 
performance audits have different goals altogether compared to financial and 
compliance audits, thus putting the two on the same level may be misleading. The 
value of financial, compliance and performance audits is clear and the challenge is to 
coordinate audits to minimise the demands on EU and MS participants.   
 
• Accountability. In the case of EU funds operating under the ‘shared management’ 
principle, there is a need for mechanisms to provide assurance that the information 
is accurate and reliable. Thus, ESIF control and audit procedures are part of an 
accountability chain through the various checks, verifications, controls and audits of 
financial management, control and audit (by MS and programme authorities, the 
European Commission and the ECA). This mix of internal controls and audits, and 
external audits has led to a reduction in error rates but it is also important to recognise 
wider contributions to transparency and improving understanding of who is 
accountable for what outcomes. The strength of this accountability chain relies on the 
strength of its individual components at all levels. If these mechanisms do not exist, 
or do not perform effectively and efficiently, the accountability chain is broken.  
 
Specific issues 
• Reconsider the designation procedure. The principle of proportionality could be 
valuable here, targeting systems that are or have recently been in flux for full 
designation process but applying lighter approaches for established, stable systems. 
However, in reality Member States prefer to have the ‘heavier’ approach to 
designation, due to concerns that future audits and controls might identify errors and 
that they would be punished. Thus, Member States are reluctant to take on 
responsibilities that would decrease complexity in this area. Institutional stability 
across programme periods would alleviate this problem.  
• SCOs have proven useful and should be extended. However, more clarity should 
be provided on aspects that relate to their application, (e.g. calculation of unit costs 
and application of public procurement rules). There needs also to be procedures in 
place to ensure that simplified controls on some aspects are not counterbalanced with 
additional controls on other elements of the same projects. In this context, a useful 
rule highlighted in the case study research is contained in Article 14(i) of the ESF 
Regulation. It allows for standard scales of unit costs and lump sums to be set out in 
a delegated act. These are different from ‘classical’ simplified costs as specified under 
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Article 67 CPR. The Commission can adopt Delegated Acts concerning the types of 
operations covered, the definitions of the standard scales of unit costs and lump sums 
and their maximum amounts, which may be adjusted according to the applicable 
commonly agreed methods, taking due account of experience gained during the 
previous programming period. Essentially, Article 14.1 a way to pre-approve 
Simplified Cost Options, giving legal certainty to MS/regions that are wary of getting 
the methodology wrong. This gives the possibility for the Commission to define by 
delegated act standard scales of unit costs and lump sums and the possibility for MS 
to apply its own accounting practices with the beneficiary.89 In this context, it should 
be noted that the draft Omnibus Regulation proposes the increased use of SCOs, that 
the responsibilities of MAs regarding the verification of expenditure when simplified 
cost options are being used should be specified in more detail. The regulation also 
proposes that Delegated Acts should be used to empower the Commission to define 
the standard scales of unit costs or the flat rate financing, the fair, equitable and 
verifiable method on which they may be established, and the financing based on the 
fulfilment of conditions related to implementation or the achievement of programme 
objectives rather than on costs. 
• Annual reporting presents benefits, but further streamlining is needed. While 
the principle of annual reporting is appreciated by programme authorities, because it 
offers a more structured approach to creating assurance over the programming period 
and addresses some of the complexity encountered at programme closure, it is 
challenging for programme authorities to implement. Further simplification should 
include the timely publication of Commission guidelines, so that IT systems can be 
planned to collect the right data from the start, and the elimination of duplications or 
overlaps between this task and the Annual Control report prepared by the Audit 
Authority. 
• Dedicated rules and support for specific types of programmes and 
operations. There has to be dedicated support and rules for beneficiaries and 
Managing Authorities in setting up and implementing control and audit arrangements 
for specific types of programme and operation e.g. ETC, FIs and revenue-generating 
projects. For specific types of programme and intervention there has been a steady 
accumulation of rules and guidance over programming periods. This has reduced legal 
certainty and caused confusion. While there have to be different control mechanisms 
for different types of operation, and not a ‘one size fits all’ approach, this may require 
the introduction of softer governance arrangements but this in turn requires trust. For 
instance: 
• For FIs, fieldwork research carried out for this study identified the following options 
to deal with such specific complexity: separating out FIs in dedicated priorities (or 
possibly programmes, where a critical mass might justify this); setting minimum 
allocations for the funds to be established (e.g. EUR 200 million); standardising the 
structures of funds. Legal certainty continues to be a problem in this area, sometimes 
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causing friction between MAs and AAs; thus timely, targeted and clear-cut 
Commission guidance is also seen as crucial in the future.90 
• For ETC, special exemptions or differentiation of the rules applicable to these 
programmes could both simplify management and limit the risk of errors and 
irregularity. The use of flat rates, for example, is discouraged by the current limit of 
20% of projects’ costs. This limit is too low for the type of projects implemented in 
ETC programmes, which are largely concentrated on staff costs and acquisition of 
external expertise. Thus specific rules should be adopted in this specific context. Special 
consideration should be given to the impact of state aid rules on this type of programme. State aid 
is major source of complexity but the impact of ETC programmes on markets is minimal. State aid 
responsibilities are very national and are not easily adapted to the multinational composition of 
projects. 
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ANNEX:  LIST OF INTERVIEWEES  
3 senior representatives of European Commission 
 DG Regio, Better Implementation Unit 
 DG Regio, Coordination, Relations with Court of Auditors and OLAF 
 DG Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion, audit and shared management. 
7 senior representatives of European Court of Auditors. 
15 senior representatives of MAs and AAs, from 7 case study OPs. 
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This study assesses the relationship between two components of European 
Structural and Investment Funds -- control and audit systems, and 
simplification measures designed to reduce the complexity of implementation 
-- and explores how this relationship conditions performance. It sets out 
financial control and audit systems and tasks in 2014-2020, and assesses the 
causes of complexity before exploring how issues are being addressed in the 
simplification agenda. The study reviews the treatment of control and 
simplification in the post-2020 debate before drawing together conclusions 
and recommendations for ESIF stakeholders. 
